Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends, Developments, and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis by Aronofsky, David
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 10 | Number 1 Article 7
Winter 1985
Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends,
Developments, and the Need for Widespread
Adoption of Enterprise Analysis
David Aronofsky
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Aronofsky, Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends, Developments, and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise
Analysis, 10 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 31 (1985).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol10/iss1/7
Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends,
Developments, and the Need for Widespread
Adoption of Enterprise Analysis
David Aronofsky*
I. Introduction
Multinational enterprises collectively represent the most power-
ful economic forces in the world. Their continued economic potency
depends in part upon adequate legal liability risk assessment for the
acts of their corporate constituents, which requires an ability by the
enterprise legal planner to predict when courts will apply the doc-
trine of limited liability. This doctrine has traditionally meant, with
certain narrowly defined exceptions, "that shareholders of a corpora-
tion are under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors."'
The limited liability doctrine has unfortunately spawned large
numbers of inconsistent, often illogical, and increasingly unpredict-
able decisions from courts confronted by the issue whether to pierce
the corporate veil. One noted legal scholar has described the result-
ing veil-piercing jurisprudence as a compendium of "hundreds of
decisions that are irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible. " 2
The United States Supreme Court has characterized the legal rules
and principles for resolving the issue of when to pierce the corporate
veil of one corporation for the acts of its affiliate as "still enveloped
* Associate, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C. B.S. 1970, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin; M.Ed. 1972, Southern Methodist University; Ph.D. 1975, Flor-
ida State University; J.D. 1982, University of Texas at Austin.
I Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L.
351, 353 (1979). The Supreme Court has recently observed that limited liability is "the
rule, not the exception, and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast enter-
prises are launched, and huge sums of capital invested." First National City Bank v. Banco
para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591, 2599-2600 (1983) (quoting Anderson
v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)). This view is by no means limited to the United States,
as noted by Professor Horn: "The absence of personal liability of a shareholder for the
company is a basic principle of corporation law in all Western countries and a basic tenet
underlying the construction of combines." Horn, International Rules for Multinational Enter-
prises: The ICC, OECD, and ILO Initiatives, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 923, 934 (1981). See generally P.
MEINHARDT, COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (3d ed. 1981).
2 p. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS § 1.02, at 8 (1983). An American
trial judge recently noted: "The corporate veil has become a misnomer in modern times
...and because the courts have recognized that a corporate veil may be pierced for one
purpose, but not another, today's corporation is multiveiled." Amarillo Oil Co. v. Mapco,
Inc., 99 F.R.D. 602, 603 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
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in the mists of metaphor,"'3 and the leading British writer on this
subject has stated that the resulting body of case law "smacks of
palm tree justice rather than the application of legal rules."'4 This
tendency poses greater potential harm than either the chilling of in-
vestor activity through increased risk of shareholder liability, which
the limited liability doctrine seeks to avert; or the commission of
fraud, injustice or unfairness, which corporate veil-piercing seeks to
avoid, since failure to correct such a trend undermines the credibility
of the judicial system to resolve the legal disputes in a fair, consis-
tent, and predictable manner.
To achieve greater consistency and coherence in the resolution
of legal disputes arising from the conduct, and occasionally the sta-
tus of multinational company affiliated corporations, this article pro-
poses that a framework based upon enterprise analysis principles be
used by the courts in their treatment of all veil-piercing issues. Such
an analysis presumes the disregard of the corporate veil for liability,
jurisdiction, and other legal purposes once common ownership, di-
rection, and unity of economic purpose among corporate affiliates
within the company can be shown. 5 To overcome this presumption,
a corporation would have to show that its conduct and economic sta-
tus within an enterprise are completely unrelated to the dispute
before the court. It could not rely solely upon legally separate cor-
porate existence or observation of separate corporate formalities to
overcome this presumtion, except to the extent a specific statute per-
mits such a defense. Meeting such a burden would be extremely dif-
ficult for parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries
absent express statutory authority to the contrary. This rule is con-
sistent with the recent Supreme Court determination that a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary possess identical legal and economic
interests as a matter of law. 6
Use of enterprise analysis principles in veil-piercing cases could
significantly improve the quality of judicial decision-making. These
principles are clearly in harmony with both recently developing, and,
in some instances, fairly well established legal trends. Further, they
may constitute a return to, rather than a radical departure from, ba-
sic corporation law tenets of limited liability, which were originally
created to protect natural persons rather than incorporated share-
3 Banco para el Comercio, 103 S. Ct. at 2598 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244
N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E.2d 58, 68 (1926)).
4 L. C. B. GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW 138 (4th ed. 1979).
5 For purposes of this work, "parent" shall mean a corporation that possesses a ma-
jority interest or voting control over the shares of a separately incorporated subsidiary or
affiliate. "Subsidiary" and "affiliate" are also interchangeable, except where specified to
the contrary in the text. The author would call attention to the Fifth Circuit admonitions in
Baker v. Raymond Intern., Inc., 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981), that terminology in veil-
piercing cases should not be taken too literally. Id. at 179 n.5.
6 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2742 (1984).
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holders. 7 Enterprise analysis also reflects the economic reality of nu-
merous multinational companies, which seldom, if ever, have qualms
about disregarding the separate legal identities of their own corpo-
rate constituencies when to do so would permit maximization of
profits for the company as a whole. The proposed alternative does
not offend constitutional personal jurisdictional principles, particu-
larly regarding multinational company corporate affiliates; nor does
it seek to modify the recently emergingforum non conveniens doctrine,
which encourages various legal disputes involving a multinational
company to be heard in a foreign forum whenever the facts support
such a result. Rather, the alternative seeks to replace an ineffectual
body of veil-piercing law that "fails to provide a workable framework
for analysis" with a more suitable set of rules.8
II. General Theories of Piercing the Corporate Veil and Inherent
Legal Conflicts Involving the Multinational Company
A. The Inadequacy of International Law for Resolving Veil-Piercing
Disputes Involving the Multinational Company
One of the great problems confronting multinational corpora-
tions today is the lack of uniformity in corporate and commercial
laws around the world. 9 The legal relationships among corporate af-
filiates of such an enterprise traditionally reflect the notion that each
is a "native within the country of its incorporation," a concept some-
what removed from the extraterritoriality of home country law and
foreign parental control over the activities of the host country "citi-
zens." 0 In disputes involving multinational enterprises, interna-
7 It should also be remembered that the initial and still principal purpose of the
limited liability doctrine has been to satisfy "[a] practical need ... for natural persons to
be able to pool their capital into operative business entities while protecting the personal
assets of each investor from the unrelated claims of co-investors and of persons dealing
with the business entity." Bryant, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 87 COMM. L.J. 299, 299 (1982)
(emphasis added). See generally BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 1.01.1, at 3-4.
8 See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at xxvii.
9 Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transanational Law, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 739, 741-42 (1970). There are fairly substantial variations in corporate law and its
judicial application among the common law countries; between common law and civil law
countries; and particularly among civil law countries, prompting Professor Schlesinger to
conclude that "insofar as corporation laws are concerned, it is difficult to divide the civil-
law world into. . . convenient groupings." R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 748 (4th
ed. 1980).
Professor Hadari wrote some years ago that the law related to multinational enter-
prises "remains undeveloped despite [its] dramatic rise ...since World War II ....
[Wihile the character of business has become multinational, the essence of corporate law
remains national. This incongruity causes problems." Hadari, The Structure of the Private
Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. L. REV. 729, 754 (1973).
Professor Charney writes that the transnational corporations themselves "recognize
the benefits of a uniform regulatory scheme that would avoid many of the difficulties pro-
duced by varying national requirements." Charney, Transnational Corporations and Develop-
ing Public International Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 749.
10 Vagts, supra note 9, at 743.
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tional law has served the limited role of defining corporate
nationality. Barcelona Traction," the leading contemporary interna-
tional law case on corporations, held in a sharply divided Interna-
tional Court of Justice opinion that corporate nationality is
determined by the place of incorporation. 12 Although an interna-
tional definition of corporate nationality is not without its use in
resolving certain legal disputes, reaching a consensus about the na-
ture of such a definition will be difficult, if not impossible, because
international legal authority recognizes at least five separate and dis-
tinct tests.' 3
International law provides little aid to courts adjudicating legal
actions brought against affiliate members of the multinational enter-
prise. This is not surprising, because traditionally "[w]hen a state has
a recognized basis for prescribing rules to govern a person or activ-
ity, international law is usually neutral."' 14 The emerging codes of
conduct that seek to guide governments and enterprises in their rela-
tionships with one another, may ultimately flesh out the current skel-
eton of international corporate law and the even barer skeleton of
international law applied to transnational corporate veil-piercing. 15
These codes generally do not bind a court seeking to resolve a legal
dispute, and some code provisions may well contravene the law or
public policy of the sovereign state whose court is adjudicating the
dispute. While it should not be assumed that the multinational
codes subscribed to by various nations do not complement or even
occasionally comprise international law, courts generally must look
to domestic rather than international legal sources for resolving cor-
porate veil-piercing issues in cases involving the transnational, mul-
ticorporate enterprise.' 6
"1 1970 I.C.J. 3 (judgment of Feb. 5).
12 id. at 42.
13 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 20.02, at 408.
14 Park, Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accrual Basis Taxation: Lifting the Corporate Veil to Tax For-
eign Company Profits, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1609, 1646 (1978).
15 See Horn, supra, note 1. See also Stanley, International Codes of Conduct for MNCs: A
Skeptical View of the Process, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 973, 996-1001 (1981); Coombe, Multinational
Codes of Conduct and Corporate Accountability: New Opportunities for Corporate Counsel, 36 Bus.
LAw. 11 (1980) (discussion of existing and proposed codes of conduct and their legal im-
plications for the multinational enterprise); Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 3 (N. Horn ed. 1980).
16 American courts seem particularly reluctant at times to apply international legal
principles to domestic disputes, since to do so "places an awesome duty on ... courts to
derive from an amorphous entity-i.e., the 'law of nations'-standards of liability applica-
ble [to] concrete situations." Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). This is not to
suggest that international law derived from the collective decisions of courts around the
world does not recognize or contemplate corporate veil-piercing principles. See, e.g., R.
BLANPAIN, THE BADGER CASE AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES 210 (1977) (OECD Declaration of International Investment and Multinational En-
terprises applied to specific veil-piercing case); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET
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B. Roots of the Conflict Between the Limited Liability and Veil-
Piercing Doctrines
The rationale for judicial piercing of the corporate veil, while
often taken for granted, is not always consistently articulated. In
common law countries, and in an increasing number of civil law na-
tions as well, courts have not always waited for legislative abrogation
of limited liability. The United States Supreme Court provided the
reason for this in Bangor Panta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Arrostook:17
"Although a corporation and its shareholders are deemed separate
entities for most purposes, the corporate form may be disregarded in
the interests of justice when it is used to defeat an overriding public
policy."' 8
The United States Supreme Court has also provided the princi-
pal rationale and leading American legal authority for refusal to
pierce the veil of the multicorporate enterprise in Cannon Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.' 9 Even though the case involved purely
domestic parties, as well as domestic questions of fact and law,
United States courts have frequently applied its rule in transnational
legal disputes of similar type. Cannon brought a breach of contract
action against Cudahy in North Carolina, Cannon's home state and
the place where the contract was negotiated. Cannon tried to obtain
jurisdiction over Cudahy, a Maine corporation, through a wholly
owned Alabama subsidiary that had actually negotiated and signed
the contract. Evidence indicated that Cudahy not only owned all the
capital stock of its subsidiary, but also controlled its operations as if
the subsidiary were an unincorporated branch or department.20 Be-
cause Cudahy observed the formality of separate incorporation, how-
ever, the Court rejected the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the
parent.
The Cannon Court stated that "Congress has not provided that a
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 457 (1979) (discussing EC anti-
trust veil-piercing principles); Baade, supra note 15, at 33-34 (Danish case involving OECD
veil-piercing issues); Coombe, Multinational Codes of Conduct-A New Dimension in Corporate
Accountability, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IN 1980 1, 9-10 (M. Landwehr ed. 1980) (Dutch court applying OECD princi-
ples); Bayer v. Federal Cartel Office, in I COMPANY LAW 52 (1980) (German antitrust veil-
piercing case); Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence; Deltec Update, 11 LAW. AM. 43 (1979) (Argen-
tinian veil-piercing decisions); Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence. The Jurisprudence." The Parke-
Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAw. AM. 320 (1974); Nunziante, Divestiture of Investments in Italy and
Other European Countries, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD IN 1981, 263, 273 (discussing Euro-
pean veil-piercing trends). These sources all refer either to various cases in which the
courts decided to pierce the veil of a multinational corporation to reach its foreign affiliate;
or to similar types of disputes resolved prior to entering the judicial process. In the OECD
nations, veil-piercing seems to depend upon whether the subsidiary is solvent, a test not
particularly favored by most American courts.
17 417 U.S. 703 (1974).
18 Id. at 713.
19 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
20 Id. at 335.
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corporation of one state should be amenable to suit in the federal
court . . . whenever it employs a subsidiary corporation as the in-
strumentality for doing business therein. '21 The Court sought to
distinguish between the jurisdictional amenability to suit of the par-
ent and its affiliate's potential liability for allegedly wrongful acts. 22
A defendant incapable of suit in a given court for lack ofjurisdiction,
however, will probably escape judgment that imposes liability.
Cannon has never been overruled, and is still frequently cited to
support decisions that refuse to pierce the corporate veil, albeit for
somewhat different reasons. Subsequent courts, confronted with a
choice between the rather rigid ruling and the need for "justice" al-
luded to in Bangor Panta have tended to favor the flexibility ofjustice
over the rigidity of the ruling, but only with considerable analytical
difficulty, because the two principles permit little room for compro-
mise.23 When read together, the two cases present a dilemma to a
court called upon to resolve a dispute involving separate but affili-
ated corporate entities. While many federal decisions seem to treat
Cannon as substantially modified, if not practically overruled, others
show great deference to the Cannon espousement of the basic sepa-
rate corporation principles.2 4 Cannon no longer serves as binding
precedent on the jurisdictional rule because of subsequent legal de-
velopments regarding the specific jurisdictional issues in the case.
21 Id. at 336.
22 Id. at 337. It should be noted that Cannon only applies to federal diversity jurisdic-
tion over such suits, and it was decided prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
which dramatically changed the manner in which federal courts construed substantive laws
and rights in causes of action rooted in state, rather than federal law.
23 Typical of such efforts is Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. (VWAG), 481 F. Supp.
868 (D.S.C. 1979), a personal injury suit brought by a South Carolina citizen against
VWAG, a German corporation, and various of its U.S. subsidiaries and affiliates, for harm
suffered in California allegedly caused by VWAG's defectively manufactured automobile.
The Roorda plaintiff sought jurisdiction over VWAG through its New Jersey subsidiary,
which imported most of VWAG's automobiles into the United States. The court ruled that
such jurisdiction existed, concluding:
It appears . . . that the great majority of the courts . . . involved with a par-
ent-subsidiary issue in which jurisdiction is sought over the parent, have not
overruled Cannon but have found means to avoid the stringent Cannon princi-
ple in all instances when the parent completely dominates the activities of the
subsidiary ....
Id. at 876. The Roorda court also noted that "it seems apparent to this court from multitu-
dinous decisions of state and federal courts throughout the United States, that the princi-
ple announced twenty years later by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), changed the concept ofjurisdiction and substantially
eroded the stringent jurisdictional test applied in Cannon." The Supreme Court in Interna-
tional Shoe established a new test for personal jurisdiction based upon minimum contacts of
the defendant with the forum state. Whether Roorda accurately reflects the current state of
the Cannon rule remains subject to future Supreme Court clarification.
24 See, e.g., Snyder v. Hampton Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 130 (D. Md. 1981); Finance
Co. of America v. Bankamerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 1980). While Dean
Blumberg's observation that Cannon's influence is "unmistakeably on the wane," he also
notes that the authority is still strong, an observation borne out by numerous examples.
BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 44. For a general discussion of the case, see also id. at § 3.03.
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Its formalism principle, which protects separate affiliated corporate
legal identities from liability, not only remains viable but sustains the
conflict with its doctrinal nemesis of piercing the corporate veil in
the name of justice.
C. Theories of Piercing the Corporate Veil
The concept of "entity" 2 5 initially was developed to distinguish
legally a sole corporation from its individual investor-shareholders,
but has been extended to situations where a corporation has become
a subsidiary or affiliate of a larger enterprise, which is itself a corpo-
ration separate from its shareholders. 26 The limited liability doc-
trine, which insulates from the acts of the corporation, all
shareholders, whether natural or corporate persons, developed as a
rule in support of the entity concept. 27 The entity concept and lim-
ited liability doctrine have evolved into a rule of hornbook law that
mere ownership of a subsidiary doing business in a particular forum
will not subject the parent to jurisdiction or liability there, as long as
the formalities of separate corporate identity are maintained.
Exceptions to the traditional entity-limited liability rule have
long existed to prevent corporate shareholders from achieving illegal
or socially intolerable results through use of a corporate structure.
These exceptions collectively comprise corporate veil-piercing law,
although they are not always clearly identified as such. While there
are substantial variations, veil-piercing responses may be divided
into three distinct groups for analytical and illustrative purposes:
veil-piercing by statute, by alter ego or instrumentality analysis, and
under an enterprise or unitary business theory.
1. Statutory Veil-Piercing
An often overlooked exception to the limited liability rule, oc-
curs frequently in the areas of greatest economic consequence to the
multinational business enterprises. 28 In most substantive legal ar-
25 See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 1.01.1, at 1-4.
26 Id., § 1.01.2, at 4-5.
27 Id., § 1.01.1, at 2. See also Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Afih-
ate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Cni. L. REv. 589, 618 (1975).
28 To list some examples, U.S. federal securities and commodities laws presume that
a parent or principal shareholder corporation can be liable for the misconduct of its corpo-
rate affiliates in any securities or commodities sale, issuance, registration, transfer, or ex-
change use. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t (securities); 7 U.S.C. § 4 (commodities); see infra notes 192-
209 and accompanying text.
U.S. export control laws impose substantial penalties upon not only American corpo-
rations but also their foreign affiliates for conduct in the sale of numerous technologically
sophisticated products and systems. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (federal export control stat-
utes). American banks are presumptively liable by statute for the acts of all their overseas
banking subsidiaries and affiliates. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (federal bank statutes regarding Edge
Act subsidiaries). For a related discussion, see infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
In an area that promises to become a fertile litigation field for multinational corpora-
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eas, state laws parallel, and at times surpass, their federal counter-
parts in the imposition of legal obligations upon corporations for the
acts of foreign affiliates. In virtually all of these areas, federal and
state statutes or procedural rules prescribe the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over any entity subject to liability under a corresponding sub-
stantive law.
Statutory veil-piercing generally assures uniform application of
legal rules and standards, thus bringing predictability to judicial de-
cision-making. The legislative branch has thus predated the judiciary
in granting de facto enterprise analysis to the multinational company
for liability, indicated in the discussion of recent trends and develop-
ments below.
2. Alter Ego-Instrumentality Analysis and Other Traditional
Judicial Approaches
Absent statutory guidance to the contrary, courts generally rec-
ognize a heavy presumption that the separate corporate entity
should be respected for all purposes. Once parent-subsidiary or af-
filiate relationships proceed beyond mere stock ownership, director
nominations, and payment or receipt of dividends and other earn-
ings, they become subject to closer judicial scrutiny of liability and
jurisdictional issues. Two separate but related categories of such
scrutiny become apparent; one based upon a "common identity" ex-
ception to the separate entity rule, where a parent and affiliate are
treated as one entity for legal purposes because they act as one, and
the other resulting from the purported existence of an "agency" re-
lationship where the acts of one corporate entity are attributed to the
other.29
In deciding whether to pierce the veil for liability or jurisdiction
purposes, courts using the traditional approach generally review fac-
tors regarding the identities, formalities, and status of the corporate
affiliates to see if enough are present to signify parental control over
its affiliate's conduct or commercial decisions.30 A finding of such
tions with substantial American work forces, federal pension laws impose liability upon all
solvent corporate affiliates for the pension obligations of insolvent or delinquent affiliates
and even permit the assets of all affiliates to be used in calculation of the liability amounts,
once certain stock ownership requirements have been met. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(l), 1362.
For a related discussion, see infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
Federal tax laws have long imposed tax liability upon American corporations for the
income of their overseas subsidiaries and courts have acted liberally in reliance upon such
statutes to subject all foreign subsidiary activities to their scrutiny and jurisdiction for col-
lection enforcement purposes. Note, State Taxation of Foreign Source Income through Worldwide
Combined Reporting, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAw 95, 103 & nn. 41-43 (1984) (discussing
pertinent I.R.C. sections).
29 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 1.02, at 9.
30 These factors include: (1) stock ownership; (2) directors and officers common to
both parent and subsidiary; (3) the financial relationship between parent and subsidiary,
and whether the latter is economically autonomous from the former; (4) whether the par-
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control will often justify a waiver of limited liability when the court
determines that exercise of such control has resulted in illegality,
fraud, or injustice. There is also a tendency to substitute "funda-
mental unfairness" for fraud or injustice and to define the former
broadly enough to impose liability on a parent for failure to avert the
insolvency of its subsidiary when such failure benefits the parent.3'
This veil-piercing "analysis by checklist," accompanied by the
search for fraud or injustice, has received sharp and well-founded
criticism. This approach has been characterized as little more than
"jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet," and there are few if any ra-
tional criteria to guide judicial weighing of the factors.3 2 For exam-
ple, undercapitalization is one factor that always receives close
attention by the courts and will almost always justify a piercing of the
corporate veil. Unfortunately, in the absence of statutory require-
ments, undercapitalization is difficult to define and ostensibly could
never apply to affiliates of the larger multinational enterprise. 33
The common identity analysis yields too many inconsistent judi-
cial decisions. Courts predisposed to respect the corporate entity
ent subscribes to all or most of the capital stock, and whether the parent incorporated the
subsidiary; (5) whether the subsidiary is grossly undercapitalized; (6) whether the parent
pays salaries and expenses of subsidiary operations, and whether the parent guarantees or
covers any of the subsidiary's financial losses; (7) whether the subsidiary has any business
apart from that with the parent, and whether the subsidiary maintains any separate assets;
(8) whether the parent treats the subsidiary as an unincorporated division or department;
(9) whether subsidiary directors and officers have any autonomy from parental authority;
(10) whether the formal legal prerequisites for separate incorporation are observed by the
parent; (11) whether the parent treats the subsidiary's assets and property as its own. Bar-
ber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 371, 398 (198 1) (quoting Fish v. East,
114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940)). See also BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 16-19.
31 Verreries de l'Hermitage, S.A. v. Hickory Furniture Co., 704 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1983); Cunningham v. Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1983); Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2089
(1983) (use of insolvent subsidiary's assets to benefit its parent found fundamentally
unfair).
32 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 7-8. His list of "metaphors" includes "adjunct,"
"agency," "agent," "alter ego," "conduit," "dummy," "instrumentality," "mere deport-
ment," "pawn," "puppet," "shell", and "tool," the use of which generally signifies that a
court believes the veil should be pierced. One commentator has concluded that the alter
ego-instrumentality doctrine "has not developed into a cogent body of law" because the
judicial desire to see justice done in every case, accompanied by the veil-piercing prerequi-
site "bad faith" conduct search, converts the analysis into a perfunctory exercise at best.
Comment, The Alter Ego Doctrine: Alternative Challenges to the Corporate Form, 30 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 129, 139 (1982).
33 Some courts now include an assets manipulation component in their capitalization
analyses, which more closely approximates a reasonable test:
[W]here the controlling entity of one corporation siphons off the assets of
that corporation into another controlled corporation in order to place the
assets of a siphoned corporation beyond the reach of legitimate creditors,
justice and equity decree that the Court should pierce the corporate veil with
respect to these attempted transfers of assets in order to prevent.. "repre-
hensible conduct."
Talen's Landing, Inc. v. M/V Venture II, 656 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord North
Pacific S.S. Co. v. Pyramid Ventures Group, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1436 (E.D. La. 1983).
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have generally ignored a subsidiary's often inherent lack of capacity
to function independently from the parent. In such cases, piercing
the veil for liability, jurisdiction, or some other legal purpose may
require complete disregard of corporate formalities and fraudulent
intent, and may cause an unjust result.34 Adoption of these stan-
dards suggests that courts would never pierce the veil of the multina-
tional enterprise, a result with little rational basis. 35 Furthermore, to
these courts, not even unjust results are sufficient to find such a rela-
tionship between parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries. 36
Use of the agency theory to pierce the corporate veil has also
been heavily criticized. When the subsidiary acts as the parent's
agent by doing all the business the parent could do with its own un-
incorporated representatives, or vice versa, the agency theory re-
quires the principal corporation to answer for the conduct of the
agent. Defining an agency relationship within a large enterprise,
however, is not simple. A literal application of the theory subsumes
the doctrine of limited liability, and courts often confuse traditional
agency law, which requires a formal agency agreement, with the mul-
tifactored instrumentality and control analysis discussed above. 37
While use of a separate corporation to prevent legal liability is
sufficient to support the finding of an agency relationship under this
analysis, stock ownership and control by the parent through com-
mon directors may not be enough, although courts often have diffi-
culty making a practical distinction. 38 Some courts refuse to find an
34 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 1.02.1, at 11-13. See, e.g., Laborers Clean-Up Contract
Administration Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Service, Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 523-25 (9th
Cir. 1984).
35 In fact, at least one court has refused to pierce the corporate veil even where the
"shell" corporation had no assets, was completely autonomous from its shareholders, and
was without any formal corporate attribute other than its certificate, all classic symptoms of
an alter ego relationship. Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979).
36 A.G. Nelson v. International Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984). The court
refused to find a common identity between parent and its wholly owned subsidiary in a
products liability case where corporate formalities were met. The case was dismissed on
limitations grounds, a harsh result that nevertheless may have been proper under applica-
tion of state laws governing the dispute.
37 Professor Seavey offers perhaps the most widely accepted position regarding an
agency relationship between corporate affiliates:
A corporate subsidiary is not, as such, an agent of the parent company. The
mere fact of stock ownership and a common board of directors does not
make it one. One may become an agent, however, if it is employed by the
parent to conduct its transactions. Further, if it is found that one exists only
to disguise the parent's activities or prevent liability, the latter is responsible
for its conduct as if it were an agent.
W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 1OG (1964). Accord RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter's notes at 68 (1958). But see BLUMBERG, supra note 2,
§ 1.02.2, at 20-23.
38 In one of the more intriguing transnational cases, an American court explained
how the theory might be applied:
The relationship of parent and subsidiary, though not by itself jurisdiction
conferring, gives rise to an inference of a broad agency relationship between
the two, even when, as here, it is the parent that is within the jurisdiction and
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agency relationship unless the "significant decisions" of the subsidi-
ary are approved by the parent, but offer little guidance for deter-
mining which decisions are significant. 39
The application of agency standards to alter ego analyses, and
vice versa, is not the only example of legally inconsistent veil-pierc-
ing by the courts. To establish an alter ego or instrumentality rela-
tionship in all jurisdictions, and to establish an agency relationship in
at least some of them, it is also necessary to prove that some degree
of control exists and is exercised by one corporation over another.
In some instances, courts will follow the statutory definition of con-
trol.40 Occasionally, however, even statutory definitions will receive
exceptionally narrow construction by courts committed to the pres-
ervation of legally separate corporate entities. 41 When no statute ex-
ists, courts generally apply a far more rigorous definition.
The majority rule seems to be that a foreign parent corporation
cannot be subject to a court's jurisdiction on the basis of a wholly
owned subsidiary's presence as long as formal separation between
the two is maintained, unless the parent conducts business within the
forum through the subsidiary. Even conducting business in such a
manner, however, normally will not subject the parent to liability for
the subsidiary's conduct absent both total disregard of corporate for-
malities and a close relationship between the nature of the business
conducted in the forum and the litigation. 42 Most courts have not
yet adopted the view for veil-piercing purposes that a parent controls
the business of its subsidiary by the acts of stock ownership and vot-
ing, nomination of key personnel, and responsible management.
Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., however, suggests that mere
ownership alone gives the parent and its wholly owned subsidiary a
unity of identity for legal liability purposes.
Another theory of judicial abrogation of limited liability is the
doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy. 43 Until the Supreme Court
not the subsidiary .... [T]he activities of the instate parent will confer ju-
risdiction under an agency theory if the corporation within the state 'does all
the business which [the other corporation] could do were it here by its own
officials.'"
Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines, 502 F. Supp. 848, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
39 Translation Sys., Inc. v. Applied Technology Ventures, 559 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D.
Md. 1983). A District of Columbia federal court recently refused to pierce the veil of a
foreign subsidiary to reach an American parent absent a showing of fraud. The court held
that the companies observed separate corporate formalities despite their agency relation-
ship and virtual integration as part of an economic entity. Penick v. Frank E. Basil, Inc. of
Delaware, 579 F. Supp. 160 (D.D.C. 1984).
40 See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
42 See Hargrave v. Fireboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983).
43 Professor Hawk has referred to this as the "extensive albeit murky body of case law
to the effect that a conspiracy may be found under certain circumstances between two
related entities of a business enterprise where there has been separate incorporation, i.e., a
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Copperweld decision,44 some United States courts had particular fond-
ness for this theory in antitrust cases. Even though Copperweld abro-
gated the doctrine for federal antitrust conspiracies between a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiaries, the Court left open the issue
whether other affiliated corporations could engage in unlawful anti-
trust conspiracies. Courts may therefore ostensibly apply this theory
to other purported legal wrongs. 45 This is not veil-piercing in a
strict sense, because it involves separate treatment of businesses
holding themselves out as such. The assets of all corporate members
of the enterprise, however, may be reached to satisfy a judgment
when in the possession of enterprise co-conspirators, a result the
'doctrine of limited liability seeks to avoid.46
3. Veil-Piercing Under the Economic Enterprise or Unitary Busi-
ness Theory
General dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of veil-piercing anal-
ysis, reinforced by statutory schemes that foreclose a separate entity-
limited liability rule, has created pressure for development of an al-
ternative framework to resolve consistently affiliate corporation lia-
bility and jurisdiction questions. Some courts have responded by
turning to enterprise analysis, which treats the corporate compo-
nents of a company as one unit rather than as separate legal entities.
It examines whether the various corporate affiliates comprising the
enterprise have such a unity of purpose and "conduct interrelated
operations as part of an integrated enterprise under common direc-
tion directed at the maximization of return for the group as a
whole."'47 The degree of centralized control and economic integra-
tion, organization, market, and public identification as a unitary com-
pany are factors to be considered in using this theory. 48
Courts have used enterprise analysis in several types of legal dis-
putes. The most significant involves a series of multinational com-
pany challenges to state income taxation laws assessing taxes on the
basis of global income generated by all affiliates. Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont4 9 and its progeny have upheld the
parent-subsidiary or a subsidiary-subsidiary relationship." B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COM-
MON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 89 (1982).
44 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
45 Id. at 2742.
46 The basis for an intra-enterprise conspiracy is judicial acceptance of the theory that
because business entities have opted to incorporate themselves separately, they warrant
recognition as separate legal entities with regard to the burdens as well as the benefits of
their actions. Once a conspiracy is established, joint and several liability is imposed upon
all conspirators regardless of whether they are named as defendants. See, e.g., Instituto
Bancario Italiano v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 449 A.2d 210, 225 (Del. 1982); In Re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 552 F. Supp. 518, 522 (N.D. Il. 1982).
47 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 1.03, at 24.
48 Id., § 22.06, at 460-61.
49 445 U.S. 425 (1980). See also BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 22.03.5, at 440-41. A
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constitutionality of such laws when applied to companies whose cor-
porate components form a "single unitary business" or a function-
ally integrated enterprise. The rationale is that in certain
multinational companies "many of these subsidiaries and affiliates
• . . engage in business activities that form part of [an] integrated...
enterprise . . . a 'unitary business' . . . [supporting] the conclusion
that most, if not all of its subsidiaries and affiliates contribute to ap-
pellant's worldwide . . . enterprise."'50
Another traditional category of enterprise analysis cases in-
volves federal antitrust conspiracy issues. Although Copperweld only
recently abrogated this doctrine, other federal appellate courts pre-
viously had refused to apply it on the premise that affiliated corpora-
tions, both treated internally and held out to the public as a single
business entity, lack the prerequisite antitrust conspiracy capacity. 5 1
Copperweld confirmed this principle, at least in those cases involving
parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries. The Court laid ample
groundwork, however, for future elimination of the separate corpo-
rate entity-limited liability rule for other types of legal disputes. It
determined that for purposes of Sherman Act liability, a parent and
its wholly owned subsidiary always have "a complete unity of inter-
est" with common objectives and conduct because "the subsidiary
[necessarily] acts for the benefit of the shareholder, its sole share-
holder."' 52 The Court further concluded that a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiaries have a unity of purpose regardless of whether the
former maintains tight control over the latter, since the parent can
always exercise full control when the subsidiary fails to act in the
former's best interests. 53
The relationship between Copperweld and adoption of enterprise
analysis in multinational company veil-piercing cases should not be
overlooked. The Copperweld Court presumed the existence of unitary
identity solely on the basis of stock ownership, a radical departure
from traditional limited liability analyses. Copperweld also differs sig-
nificantly from the unitary tax cases in which the Court has consist-
recent comprehensive analysis of state unitary taxation may be found in Note, supra note
28. See also infra notes 131-53 and accompanying text.
50 Mobil, 445 U.S. at 435, 438-41 (emphasis added). Liability for foreign affiliate ac-
tivities in such cases requires proof of functional integration, normally manifested by cen-
tralized management and close coordination of key affiliate business activities. Exxon
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 224 (1980). This control must be
actual, not potential, and cannot be measured by mere stock ownership. F. W. Woolworth
Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354, 362 (1982); Asarco, Inc.
v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 321-25 (1982). There must be some nexus
between the unitary business activities and the activities conducted in the forum.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2940-41 (1983).
51 Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (9th Cir.
1983); General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1983).
52 Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2742.
53 Id.
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ently held that lawful imposition of tax liability requires not only
actual control, but actual integration of key business functions.
Although it is tempting to limit Copperweld to intra-enterprise anti-
trust conspiracies, such a narrow reading ignores Copperweld's basic
premise that complete disregard of separate corporate entities is log-
ical and acceptable in cases in which the economic activities of
closely affiliated corporations are subject to challenge.
Post-Copperweld decisions have extended enterprise analysis to
subsidiary corporations wholly owned by the same shareholder, as
well as to two commonly owned subsidiaries plus a third corporation
managed by the first two. 54 While these are federal antitrust cases,
their reasoning may apply to others. In fact, federal courts had pre-
viously applied the same reasoning in federal collective bargaining
litigation by determining that a corporation may be liable for an affil-
iate's collective bargaining obligations whenever the two entities
have functionally integrated operations, centralized control over la-
bor relations, common management personnel, and common
ownership. 55
Another type of enterprise or unitary business case that cuts
across various substantive areas involves the issue whether members
of a business group, present in a particular forum in corporate form,
may subject other members of the group to personal jurisdiction.
The key question is whether the business group, which holds itself
out as one common entity to the public, often through common and
well-known trademarks or franchise identification, is present in a fo-
rum for personal jurisdiction purposes. If the nonforum company
exercises some control over the use of its public identity and prod-
ucts by a forum company, the forum may have personal jurisdiction
over the nonforum company. 56
"Enterprise veil-piercing" may be a misnomer, because the en-
terprise does not acquire legal identity until after the veil is pierced.
In fact, however, enterprise analysis of liability and jurisdiction issues
results from the notion that the principal purpose of a mul-
ticorporate business entity is to achieve the economic welfare of the
group as a whole through the integrated and coordinated activities
of the individual members. Application of enterprise analysis seems
eminently more sensible than entity analysis and would yield far
more consistency in judicial decision making if it were widely
adopted.
54 Hood v. Tenneco-Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984); Lake Com-
munications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1984); Century Oil Tool, Inc. v.
Production Specialties, Inc., 737 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1984).
55 Radio Union v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965); NLRB v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982).
56 Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1983);
Dickson v. Hertz Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1169, 1176 (D. Vt. 1983).
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III. Transnational Veil-Piercing Litigation: Jurisdiction and Other
Procedural Issues
Any transnational veil-piercing case requires resolution of sev-
eral critical jurisdictional and other procedural issues. The court
must decide whether to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute, and whether foreign or domestic law, or some combination,
should govern. If the conduct occurs abroad, the injury is suffered
abroad, and most of the parties are foreign, the court must decide
whether to hear the dispute or grant a forum non conveniens dismissal.
The Court must determine whether it is legally permissible to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over the foreign parties. Finally, the court
must resolve other procedural issues related to venue and service of
process, usually by applying some aspects of the various veil-piercing
analyses.
A. Extraterritorial Application of Law and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A state's right to regulate conduct by its own nationals occurring
within the borders of another state is fairly well recognized in inter-
national law, although not without substantial debate.57 The sover-
eign state may thus regulate the conduct of its own nationals, limited
only by consideration of potential conflicts with the laws of other
sovereigns. International law also recognizes the right of a state to
punish or regulate conduct that occurs outside its territory, without
respect to the nationality of the actors, if the conduct has a suffi-
ciently adverse effect within its borders. The "effects" doctrine be-
came a significant part of international jurisprudence in the Case of the
S.S. Lotus,58 decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice
over a vigorous dissent.
The effects doctrine of extraterritorial application of law and the
corresponding exercise of subject matter jurisdiction openly
emerged in the United States in the international antitrust case
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa). 59 The court deter-
mined that the Sherman Act could be applied extraterritorially to
govern the conduct of the Canadian affiliate of the Aluminum Cor-
57 Nothstein and Ayres have noted:
A state's authority to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of its nationals in-
volves no question of an international legal violation, but solely a question of
the purport of the municipal law that establishes the duties of citizens in rela-
tion to their government. Thus, under existing international practice, a state
is assumed to have practically unlimited legal control over its nationals. This
competence can be justified on the basis of comity and because a state's
treatment of its own nationals is not ordinarily a matter of concern to other
states or to international law.
Nothstein & Ayres, The Multinational Corporation and the Extraterritorial Application of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 10 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1, 14 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
58 (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10 (udgment of Sept. 7). For a discussion
of this principle, see B. HAWK, supra note 16, at 12, 29.
59 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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poration of America because of adverse effects on American foreign
commerce. 60 The Supreme Court implicitly approved this doctrine
in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. ,61 by applying
the Sherman Act to a vanadium monopoly obtained by Union Car-
bide's Canadian affiliate to the detriment of a would-be American
competitor.
Alcoa and Continental Ore stand for a rule that allows American
courts to apply federal statutes to the activities of foreign corpora-
tions abroad if there are domestic effects, despite any apparent con-
flict with the laws of another sovereign. When applied to the
transnational enterprise controlled by an American parent, this
means that federal courts may legitimately regulate the conduct of
foreign affiliates, which are often citizens of foreign states, whenever
their conduct causes harm in the United States. 62 Federal courts
generally follow Continental Ore and Alcoa in exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over federal antitrust disputes involving anticompetitive
conduct abroad by foreign companies if there are adverse effects
upon American foreign commerce. 63 Federal courts will also exer-
cise subject matter jurisdiction in certain instances over federal se-
curities law disputes, federal income tax and most grand jury
proceedings, federal intellectual property export controls, and cer-
60 Id. at 443-44.
61 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952)
(extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982), to bar
trademark infringement by American citizen in Mexico).
62 Despite the resulting potential conflict, the American Law Institute has endorsed
the position that "[c]orporations formed under the laws of foreign states but owned or
controlled by individuals or corporations who are nationals of the United States, are po-
tentially subject to varying degrees of indirect control by the United States through its
capacity to control its own nationals." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 27, reporter's note (1965). Attempts to exercise jurisdiction over
the conduct of foreign affiliates of American corporations by American courts can provoke
substantial legal difficulty, however, since such efforts "may interfere with a [host country]
state's economic regulation of the corporate entities created by its laws and operating pri-
marily, or even exclusively, with its borders." Park, supra note 14, at 1612. This has
caused some courts to reject the rigid Alcoa jurisdictional rule in favor of a multifactored
comity analysis that considers foreign policy repercussions from the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timerberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); 1J. ATWooD,
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, §§ 6.01-6.12 (1982). See also
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (refusing to
apply federal commodities laws extraterritorially absent declarations of congressional
intent).
63 For a recent example of the effects theory of jurisdiction application, see Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For cases
refusing to exercise antitrust jurisdiction, see Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.
2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983). In federal
antitrust cases, such forum effects are all but mandatory for American company exporting
activities, since Congress amended section 7 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982), to
require a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" effect on such trade. Import
transactions are essentially presumed to have the forum effects required under the Act.
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tain labor practices. Courts will do so where these practices violate
statutes seeking to regulate a company's economic behavior even
when the actors and conduct are predominantly foreign in nature,
provided certain American nexus factors exist.64
American courts are far less likely, however, to exercise jurisdic-
tion in personal injury or contract disputes characterized by a domi-
nant presence of foreign actors and conduct, unless United States
law governs the dispute. 65 Courts generally use the multifactored
contacts analysis test set out in Lauritzen v. Larsen66 to determine the
territorial scope of federal law. The analysis examines the interests
advanced by the law in question and assesses the various contacts
between the cause of action and the countries affected by the
conduct.67
While Lauritzen did not involve any issue related to limited
shareholder liability, a subsequent Supreme Court case, Hellenic Lines
Ltd. v. Rhoditis,68 addressed this question. In a claim brought by a
foreign seaman for injury suffered on board the vessel, the Court
upheld United States jurisdiction and applied United States law, be-
cause the shipowner, although a foreign citizen, had its principal
center of corporate activities and domicile in the United States. The
Court thus looked to the principal place of business to determine the
applicable law for contact and interest analysis.
Lauritzen and Rhoditis have significantly affected the limited liabil-
ity rule in maritime tort cases and could have similar effects upon
other types of legal disputes, given the recent extension to contracts
negotiated and to be performed abroad, as well as to personal injury
and other torts resulting in injury abroad. These cases often arise
when foreign victims suffer injury outside the United States as a re-
sult of conduct by the foreign subsidiary or affiliate of an American
parent corporation. Most courts confronted with such facts apply a
Lauritzen-Rhoditis analysis and find that foreign law should govern the
dispute. If the only significant tie to the United States is parental
stock ownership and control, even when the latter is exercised,
courts will generally refuse to apply American law to the dispute and
64 See infra text accompanying note 209.
65 See, e.g., Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., 730 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984)(en banc);
Walker v. Neugent, 583 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
66 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
67 In Lauritzen the Court refused to apply the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), to a
foreign seaman who, after joining a ship's crew in New York, was injured in Cuba. The
Court analyzed (1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the ship's flag; (3) the
allegiance and domicile of the injured party; (4) the allegiance of the shipowner; (5) the
place of the labor contract; (6) the availability for a foreign forum; and (7) the law of the
forum. It concluded that since the seaman and the ship were Danish, subject to Danish
seaman's compensation law, Danish law would govern the dispute even though a federal
court had the power to hear the case. 345 U.S. at 582-93.
68 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
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will rely on the entity concept to support their decisions.69 This is
true even when an American corporation operates the instrumental-
ity causing the injury through a shell subsidiary or affiliate deliber-
ately created to avoid liability. 70
Not all United States courts, however, apply foreign law to dis-
putes arising from the offshore conduct of American-based multina-
tional companies. In a recent products liability case the court ruled
that United States law applies whenever a domestic parent corpora-
tion actively participates in product development, testing, and mar-
keting activities with its foreign subsidiary, a classic application of
enterprise analysis to a choice of law decision. 71 Application of
United States law to these cases nonetheless reflects a decidedly mi-
nority view.
Traditionally, the choice of foreign law has not been particularly
consequential in many disputes. United States courts are competent
to apply foreign law to legal controversies as long as the party seek-
ing its application is able to prove what law applies. 72 Since veil-
piercing is generally more customary under domestic than foreign
law, American corporate defendants probably benefit when foreign
law applies to cases involving potential American parent corporation
liability for the conduct of foreign affiliates.
B. Forum Conveniens Dismissals of Transnational Veil-Piercing
Disputes
An important recent development in American litigation of
transnational disputes is the judicial revitalization of the forum non
conveniens doctrine. 73 A decision to grant a forum non conveniens dis-
69 Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984) (products liabil-
ity action); Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1019 (1983) (maritime torts); Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Service Co., 650
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1981) (contract and fiduciary breach action); De Mateos v. Texaco, Inc.,
562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1977).
70 Koke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 730 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1984); Fajardo v. Tidewa-
ter, Inc., 707 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1983).
71 Anglo-Eastern Bulkships, Ltd. v. Ameron, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 1198, 1202-03
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also Hodson v. A. H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1983), afg
528 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Va. 1981) (reviewing court held it was within trial court judge's
discretion not to dismiss even though it thought foreign jurisdiction was more conve-
nient); Haddad v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Ohio 1984);
Manusamy v. McClelland Engineers, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Tex. 1984). For a recent
opinion suggesting thatforum non conveniens dismissals should be granted only rarely, see
Lehman v. Humphrey Layman, Ltd., 713 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
708 (1984), which appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
72 Manu Int'l, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 67 (2d. Cir. 1981) (rejecting
argument that choice of foreign law should support dismissal because American courts can
competently apply it); London Film Productions v. Intercontinental Communications,
Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
73 Although the doctrine has long been a part of American jurisprudence, it was only
sporadically applied to transnational disputes until 1980, when American federal courts
began viewing it as a viable means for disposing of cases better tried for reasons ofjustice
[VOL. 10
1985] PIERCING THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE VEIL 49
missal, which presumes the existence of a more suitable alternative
forum for hearing the dispute and, in fact, requires the existence of
one, lies within the discretion of the court. Such a decision may be
reversed on appeal only upon a finding of clear discretionary
abuse.74 The rule seems to be that if United States law governs the
dispute in a United States federal court, the case will be heard there;
application of foreign law in such a dispute, however, will probably
result in forum non conveniens dismissal. 75 The presence or absence of
American parental control over a foreign or American corporate af-
filiate responsible for the harm has been only a peripheral factor in
most recentforum non conveniens determinations.
Forum non conveniens is inconsistent with enterprise analysis con-
cepts, because courts applying the doctrine tend to ignore the de-
gree of corporate interrelationships and control among affiliates in
favor of judicial convenience. Courts applying enterprise analysis
presume that it is neither unfair nor inconvenient to attribute the
conduct or status of one corporate entity to all of its affiliates whose
actions are relevant to the litigation, given sufficient economic inte-
gration among the affiliates. A middle ground between these two
views would result in application of the more desirable aspects of
each to transnational corporate veil-piercing disputes. If the nexus of
a particular dispute is more foreign than domestic, and the difficul-
ties of obtaining access to relevant witnesses and evidence as well as
personal jurisdiction over all parties in a domestic court are found to
be substantial, forum non conveniens probably can and should be ap-
plied in the interests of fairness and judicial economy. Where the
degree of control and responsibility by the domestic corporation for
the conduct of its foreign affiliate in causing the harm is significant,
however, neither fairness nor convenience seems particularly appro-
priate, and the doctrine probably should not be applied. Judicious
use of this doctrine can help bring about greater consistency in the
multinational corporation veil-piercing cases.
C. Diversity of Citizenship Over the Alien Corporation
American federal courts possess jurisdiction limited to that de-
fined in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The two principal
or convenience outside the United States. Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654
F.2d 147 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Pain v. United Technologies
Corp., 637 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Calavo Growers v.
Belgium, 632 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court then assured permanent appli-
cation of the doctrine in the Piper litigation to dismiss a lawsuit arising from an airplane
crash abroad. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
74 Vaz Borralho v. Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 1983).
75 De Oliveira v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 707 F.2d 843, 845 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting
that American law choice requires exercise of jurisdiction). But see Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981) (choice of law is not sole determinative factor of
whether court should grant forum non conveniens dismissal).
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bases of federal jurisdiction over cases involving multinational enter-
prise defendants are the diversity and federal question statutes. Mar-
itime cases come under a separate federal admiralty jurisdiction
statute, while foreign government owned corporations may only be
sued in accordance with the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of
1976.76
The statutory definition of corporate citizenship is particularly
important in diversity cases, because with only limited exceptions,
state substantive law governs all such suits in federal courts. 77 In
effect, corporations are citizens of both their state of incorporation
and their principal place of business, although identification of the
latter is often difficult. 78 Federal statutes are silent, however, regard-
ing alien corporation citizenship, and neither courts nor commenta-
tors agree on whether alien corporations are citizens only of their
countries of incorporation, or whether they are also citizens of their
principal place of business. 79 Resolution of such conflicts is of con-
siderable importance because citizenship determines whether diver-
sity exists.80
It is now well settled in the United States that American subsidi-
ary corporations, wholly owned by foreign parents, are citizens of the
state where they are incorporated and possess American identity re-
gardless of whether they have any actual autonomy of their own.81
Furthermore, the rule in diversity cases is that the citizenship of a
parent company is not attributed to its subsidiary or vice versa,
76 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976), codifiedat 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-
(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982). 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), the diversity jurisdic-
tion statute, confers federal jurisdiction over all civil actions where the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the value of$10,000 and is between citizens of different states: citizens of a
state and a foreign state or citizens or subjects thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) confers
federal jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982)
confers exclusive federal court jurisdiction over all civil admiralty and maritime actions.
For FSIA cases, see infra text accompanying notes 231-45.
77 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This is true even when such cases
are removed from state to federal court pursuant to federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1982). Section 1332(c) provides that a corporation is a citizen of both the state by which
it has been incorporated and the state where it has its principal place of business. For a
thorough discussion and analysis of federal diversity jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS §§ 23-31 (3d ed. 1976).
78 C. WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 104-05.
79 Professor Wright suggests that corporations may be citizens of both places, while
Professor Moore has written that an alien corporation may only be a citizen of its state of
incorporation, a view supported by Barcelona Traction, which does not bind federal courts.
Id. at 105; 1 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.75 [2,3], at 709.6-709.85 (2d ed.
1984). Courts are equally divided on this point. Note, Alien Corporations and Federal Diver-
sityjurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 177, 178-79 (1984).
80 Note, supra note 79, at 180-81 and cases discussed therein. For a clear illustration
of the problem, compare R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 614 (N.D.
Ill. 1981), with Transworld Hospital Supplies, Ltd. v. Hospital Corp. of America, 542 F.
Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
81 Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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although at least one federal court has recently suggested that Amer-
ican incorporation alone may not have any legal significance if the
real parties in interest are foreign parents that completely control
the activities of their American affiliates.8 2 State substantive laws of
limited liability govern the other veil-piercing issues in diversity
cases once citizenship is determined under federal law.
In effect, corporations subject to United States law and jurisdic-
tion must satisfy two distinct sovereigns in many instances, and for-
eign corporations must satisfy three or four, including the foreign
state of incorporation, the principal place of business, the laws of the
state in diversity cases, and often federal law as well. The laws of
each of these places may affect the legality of the challenged conduct
or the corporate actor, and there is no existing legal mechanism for
assisting courts in resolving the inevitable conflicts among these
laws. 83 Until courts use an enterprise view instead of a nationality
standard, inconsistent decisions in multinational veil-piercing will
continue to increase.
D. Personal Jurisdiction Disputes Involving the Multinational
Corporation
Numerous American courts have assessed the "significance of
the economic activities within the forum of one component of a cor-
porate group as a basis for the assertion ofjurisdiction over a foreign
component," and their decisions "are conflicting and the overall pat-
terns confusing."'8 4 This problem is particularly acute in cases in-
volving personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation on
the basis of its domestic affiliate's forum presence. 85 Since most
courts have not adopted the enterprise view, they tend to engage in
highly subjective scrutinies and balancing tests to support their con-
tradictory results. Such contradictions are unfortunate when the de-
82 K & H Business Consultants, Ltd. v. Cheltonian, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 420, 424
(D.N.J. 1983).
83 One commentator has urged courts to "distinguish between the situations in which
a corporation is used in any attempt to evade a federal policy and those in which it is used
merely to take best advantage of legal options available to it," letting state law govern a
corporation's internal affairs and federal common law govern any external affairs related
to major federal policies. Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under
Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 868, 871 (1982). While this suggestion might
be viable in some situations, it does not fully eliminate conflicting or inconsistent veil-
piercing decisions arising from similar factual patterns governed by identical policies. Fur-
thermore, it offers little insight into how federal courts should distinguish between con-
flicting federal and state policies in diversity cases, particularly when important American
foreign commerce issues are involved.
84 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 3.01, at 40.
85 Dean Blumberg notes that the assertion of jurisdiction in such instances receives
nearly identical analysis to that given the issue whether jurisdiction should be exercised
over a foreign affiliate for the forum presence of the domestic parent. He correctly identi-
fies this similarity as consistent with the enterprise view that jurisdiction is proper over the
enterprise "when any component is before the court." Id., § 3.09, at 77-78.
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fendants are affiliates of a large multinational enterprise, and one
federal judge noted:
To any layman it would seem absurd that our courts could not ob-
tain jurisdiction over a billion dollar multinational which is exploit-
ing the critical . . . American markets to keep its home production
going at a huge volume and profit. This perception must have a
bearing on our evaluation of fairness. The law ignores the common
sense of a situation at the peril of becoming irrelevant as an
institution.
86
It is for this reason that an alternative analytical framework for
resolving such jurisdictional disputes is so sorely needed.
Personal jurisdiction analysis in the United States is divided into
resolution of two distinct issues: whether personal jurisdiction may
be constitutionally exercised, and whether a federal or state statute
permits its exercise even when constitutional prerequisites are satis-
fied. The former is by far the more significant issue. Foreign corpo-
rate defendants cannot afford to overlook the importance of
personal jurisdiction decisions, because defendants must submit to
United States jurisdiction for discovery purposes to decide their
amenability to suit. Otherwise, such defendants run the risk that the
court will find the existence ofjurisdiction as a sanction for failure to
submit to such discovery.8 7 Such a finding may then be used to sup-
port a default judgment for use in attachment of the company's
assets.
The constitutionality of a court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion depends upon a defendant's forum ties, and not those of the
plaintiff or of the action itself.88 The United States Supreme Court
has indicated the standards of due process that a multinational enter-
prise might expect in United States products liability litigation. The
Court has held that a court may constitutionally exercise personal
jurisdiction over any corporation that delivers its products, directly
or indirectly, into the stream of commerce of the forum state with the
expectation that they will be purchased there by consumers.8 9
Although the Supreme Court recently has refined some of the consti-
86 Hattori, 508 F. Supp. at 1327. For an even more critical analysis of American judi-
cial treatment of such decisions, see Lilly,Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69
VA. L. REV. 85, 87 (1983).
87 Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S.
694 (1982).
88 Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). These ties, often referred to as "minimum
contacts" with the forum, must be sufficient so that the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. This re-
quires that the forum have a legitimate regulatory interest in defendant's actionable con-
duct, that a defendant have personally availed itself of the forum's laws and protections,
and that the forum contacts support a finding that litigation arising from them is reason-
ably foreseeable there. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
89 Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
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tutional principles underlying the exercise of personal jurisdiction,
its decisions ultimately may create more confusion in veil-piercing
cases. In two of its most recent cases, the Court determined that the
exercise of such jurisdiction over alleged tortfeasors whose conduct
is likely to have harmful effects in the forum where the victim lives
and brings suit cannot offend due process, particularly where de-
fendants have cognizable commercial presence there.90 In one of
the opinions, however, the Court chose to note that "jurisdiction
over a parent corporation [does not] automatically establish jurisdic-
tion over a wholly-owned subsidiary" and cautioned that each corpo-
ration's contacts should be individually assessed. 91 This retreat to
formalism, unnecessary for the opinion and quite contradictory to
Copperweld principles, may cause confusion by converting Cannon for-
malism into a constitutional jurisdictional principle.
A decision with even greater potential significance to the mul-
tinational enterprise is Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall,92 a products liability suit against an alien corporation. Defend-
ant's American forum contacts consisted of contract negotiations in
the American office of a foreign corporation employer, receipt of
payment from checks drawn on a foreign bank, and the purchase of
helicopter equipment and training services in the forum state. 93 The
Court concluded that defendant lacked "continuous and systematic
general business contacts" necessary to support the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction under a "general" personal jurisdiction theory. It
further determined that the forum contacts were too unrelated to the
personal injury cause of action to support jurisdiction under a nar-
rower "specific" personal jurisdiction test.94
Hall's impact on future personal jurisdiction decisions affecting
alien corporate defendants is difficult to assess. At its narrowest,
Hall states that unless an alien corporate defendant has a relatively
permanent forum presence, it will not be amenable to personal juris-
diction there. An exception probably will be made when the litiga-
tion arises directly out of the defendant's contacts or presence, and
the plaintiff pleads a "specific" personal jurisdiction theory on the
basis of those contacts. This narrow reading would attribute the Hall
90 Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S.
Ct. 1473 (1984).
91 Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1482 n.13 (citing Consolidated Textile Co. v. Gregory, 289
U.S. 85, 88 (1933); Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907)).
92 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
93 Id. at 1869-70.
94 Id. at 1873 (citations omitted). The Court expressly rejected plaintiff's arguments
that "mere purchases [in the forum], even if occurring at regular intervals," were sufficient
to support a general jurisdiction theory, and revived a somewhat dated precedent to sup-
port its ruling that defendant's trips to negotiate the contract and make the purchases to
perform it were also insufficient for general personal jurisdiction purposes. Id. at 1873-74
(relying upon Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).
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dismissal to a pleading deficiency, which is an exceptionally harsh
and uncommon result. Instead, Hall may be viewed as imposing a
higher constitutional personal jurisdiction standard that requires
more extensive analysis of the quality or nature of an alien corpora-
tion's forum contacts. Such an analysis can only increase judicial un-
certainty and inconsistency because of the lack of objective criteria.
Applying Hall to an alien defendant corporation that belongs to
a multinational enterprise with a domestic forum affiliate poses even
greater uncertainty. Hall recognizes the constitutionality of exercis-
ing personal jurisdiction over an alien corporation that has continu-
ous, systematic, and commercial forum contacts, regardless whether
the litigation arises from those contacts. The decision, however,
does not address the issue whether the alien corporation has a con-
tinuous, systematic commercial presence when its affiliate conducts
business in the forum for the benefit of the enterprise as a whole. A
court following Copperweld might reasonably conclude that the forum
contacts of a wholly owned subsidiary are those of its parent, and
vice versa, although this would perhaps conflict with the Supreme
Court's admonition in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 95 that each cor-
poration's contacts be considered separately. This may result in a
finding that if the domestic corporation's forum presence is unre-
lated to the litigation, its alien affiliate may escape personal jurisdic-
tion despite permanent forum contacts through the former. This
result is supported by Cannon and Keeton principles, but is not likely
to gain acceptance by the courts, because of its great potential abuse.
Conversely, it is not certain that courts would abrogate such princi-
ples in favor of those espoused in Copperweld, unless they choose to
adopt an enterprise analysis.
While derived from inconsistent legal opinions, these principles
collectively form a rule that personal jurisdiction constitutionally
may be exercised over a foreign corporation having sufficient mini-
mum contacts. The rule, however, says nothing about how courts
should determine whether such contacts exist. Any minimum con-
tacts analysis becomes further complicated by the distinction be-
tween federal question and diversity jurisdiction decisions that
involve personal jurisdictional issues.96 Where Congress has not
95 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
96 Generally, in federal antitrust and securities cases, "any [federal] district court
from Hawaii to Florida has jurisdiction over any defendant who has 'minimum contacts'
with the United States, [regardless of] wherever those contacts may be." Smith, No Forum
At All or Any Forum You Choose: PersonalJurisdiction Over Aliens Under the Antitrust and Securities
Law, 39 Bus. LAw. 1685, 1695-96 (1984). This rule presumes an aggregation of contacts
within the United States, which is permissible if the substantive federal claim is based upon
a statutory scheme that provides for worldwide service of process. Lilly, supra note 86, at
87. This mixture of personal jurisdiction and service of process legal doctrines has been
sharply criticized, but is nonetheless common. BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 3.04.2, at 54-56.
For a list of articles questioning the applicability of this rule to alien corporations, see id. at
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provided for worldwide service of process, federal courts will either
use a state long-arm statute or look to rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists,
although neither expressly provides for aggregation of national con-
tacts for alien corporate defendants. 97 This approach has evoked
concern that absent such aggregation, alien corporate defendants
"are able to avoid establishing the requisite minimum contacts with
any individual state by dealing only through small branches or sales
representatives" or through affiliate corporations with limited or
negligible forum presence in a particular state. 98
The "stream of commerce" analysis in Worldwide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson 99 was intended to clarify the due process standard by
identifying the types of commercial activity or presence that could
subject a company to jurisdiction. Instead, however, courts have
been unable to agree on when a company's commercial activities are
sufficient for jurisdictional purposes in similar cases. 100 Nelson v.
Park Industries, Inc.-,t0 a products liability action brought against a
Hong Kong manufacturer, its Hong Kong distributor, the American
retailer, and its American insurer, is typical of decisions supporting
jurisdiction over an alien corporation under a stream of commerce
theory. The injury occurred in the United States where the product
was sold by the retailer who had purchased it in Hong Kong. Find-
ingjurisdiction over the manufacturer and distributor, the court con-
cluded that "the relevant scope [of the foreseeable market] is
56 n.23. See also 18 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 8644 (rev. perm. ed. 1983).
97 Lilly, supra note 86, at 137-39, especially nn. 202-04.
98 Note, The Outer Limits of In Personam Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations: The National
Contacts Theory, 16 GEO. WASH. J. LAW & ECON. 637, 638 (1982).
99 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
100 For example, in two recent cases, Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709 (8th
Cir. 1984), aff'g 578 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Iowa 1982), and Talbot Tractor Co. v. Hinomoto
Tractor Sales, U.S.A., 703 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983), the courts held that even if a manufac-
turer could foresee the entry of its products into the American market, there may not be a
reasonably foreseeable reason to anticipate litigation over their commercialization or use
there. Humble, 727 F.2d at 710; Talbot, 703 F.2d at 145.
Other decisions, however, hold that foreign manufacturers who know their products
will enter the American market or that their commercial activities will have direct effects
enter the American stream of commerce for personal jurisdictional purposes and have no
basis for complaint when sued on the basis of legal injury in the United States. See, e.g.,
Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983); DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc.,
711 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1983); Raffaele v. Campagnie Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d 395
(9th Cir. 1983); Myers v. John Deere Ltd., 683 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1982) (personal injury
actions arising from products made and shipped from abroad causing injury in the United
States through negligent manufacture or loading). See also Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v.
Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982); and Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688
F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1275 (1983) (defamation by nonresidents
causing alleged forum injury). See also Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine
Distributors Pty., Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (alleged trademark infringement
where mere sale in forum supported jurisdiction).
101 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984).
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generally broader with respect to manufacturers and primary distrib-
utors who are at the start of a distribution system and who thereby
serve, directly or indirectly, and derive economic benefit from a
wider market."' 0 2
Adoption of Nelson's sensible view of personal jurisdiction would
tend to favor an enterprise theory at the expense of an entity theory.
Conflicting judicial opinions, however, have resulted. The Hall desi-
sion, which involved the commercialization of services into the
American stream of commerce will probably create more conflicts
and inconsistencies absent future clarification, because it suggests
that a far more stringent test will apply. The stream of commerce
theory of personal jurisdiction over alien commercial entities, like
veil-piercing itself, has become a tool of judicial convenience to
avoid "injustice" at the expense of certainty and consistency. If
stream of commerce jurisdiction leads to contradictory results, per-
sonal jurisdiction on the basis of "minimum contacts," "conducting
business" or "transacting business" in the forum is perhaps even
more so.
10 3
Traditionally, the doing business standard has been the most
stringent, and generally requires such contacts as retention of coun-
sel, opening and maintenance of bank accounts, business solicita-
tion, and financial negotiations. 10 4 Because most states have
extended their long-arm statutes to due process limits, the three
terms have evolved into a standard similar to minimum contacts.
When the cause of action does not arise from forum contacts, how-
ever, or when the forum's law requires, courts must apply the more
rigorous doing business analysis to determine whether exercise of
personal jurisdiction meets due process.10 5
102 Id. at 1125. Accord Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding
personal jurisdiction over foreign trading company in products liability case on basis of
anticipated market).
103 These three terms are often used interchangeably by courts to reflect entirely dif-
ferent legal rules and concepts. Generally, "minimum contacts" refers to the constitu-
tional standard for personal jurisdiction and signifies that a cause of action has arisen from
the forum contacts, thus satisfying the "purposeful availment" requirement. BLUMBERG,
supra note 2, § 6.03.1, at 152-55 & n.20. "Doing business" contemplates "a pattern of
continuous and systematic activity within the forum" regardless of whether litigation arises
from such contacts and refers both to state statutory standards and federal venue require-
ments. Id. at 150-51, 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982) provides that federal venue exists in
any action against a corporation in any district "in which it is incorporated or licensed to
do business or is doing business." "Transacting business," a term incorporated in both
the Uniform Interstate Act and the International Procedure Act used as the model for
many state long-arm statutes, § 1.02, 13 U.L.A. 466 (1981 Supp.), and the federal antitrust
venue statute, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982), may in fact be synonymous with "minimum contacts"
in a practical sense, because it provides for personal jurisdiction on the basis of a single
forum transaction if the cause of action arises from that transaction. BLUMBERG, supra note
2, § 6.03.2, at 156.
104 See, e.g., Netherlands Shipmortgage Corp. v. Madris, 717 F.2d 731, 740-41 (2d Cir.
1983) (New York standard).
105 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 5.02, 7.02.5, at 104, 190-91. For a recent application
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Often the most controversial and intensely litigated issue in any
case involving affiliated corporate defendants is whether the conduct
or presence of one corporation in a forum will support jurisdiction
over an alien affiliate. Where presence and the litigation are interre-
lated, this is not so controversial, but as seen in Hall, when the forum
contact and litigation are unrelated, courts will apply the more strin-
gent doing business analysis to determine whether jurisdiction is
proper.10 6 Although mere alien parental ownership of stock in a do-
mestic subsidiary does not constitute doing business, it can create an
agency relationship that may support personal jurisdiction. Owner-
ship plus domination of the domestic affiliate by the parent will prob-
ably meet the doing business standard under an alter ego theory on
the notion that the foreign affiliate is doing business through its
dominated subsidiary. 107
Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co. 108 is a well-reasoned attempt
to resolve the issue of when a foreign corporation may be sued in
federal court to answer for the legal wrongs of its domestic affiliate.
Defendant, a Japanese conglomerate with heavy investments in time-
piece manufacturing and distribution, owned all the stock of Seiko
Corporation, an American subsidiary.' 0 9 Plaintiff, a rival timepiece
manufacturer and distributor, sued Hattori and its various American
subsidiaries for unfair competition. In exercising jurisdiction over
Hattori, the court found parental ownership of all subsidiary stock,
overlapping directors and officers, intercompany loans, consolidated
financial statements, joint publicity campaigns, and various other
links joining Hattori to its American offspring."10
Hattori could not demonstrate any evidence, such as separate
of New York's rigorous "doing business" standard, see Sohex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex
Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The court denied personal jurisdiction
over a foreign parent, although the parent controlled a foreign-based subsidiary, because
the litigation was not related to this relationship.
106 Professor Fletcher identifies the problem inherent in such an analysis, noting that
"existing case law as to what constitutes the requisite doing of business [between affiliated
corporations for jurisdictional purposes] is in such a state of confusion," that it cannot
easily be clarified because "the term is incapable of any satisfactory definition" and thus,
standards for developing one may be derived only by analyzing "the facts of each case."
W. FLETCHER, supra note 96, at § 8711.
107 Id. at § 8721.
108 508 F. Supp. 1322 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
109 Seiko Corporation, in turn, owned all the stock of various domestic timepiece dis-
tribution and service corporations. Hattori was selling an estimated 400 million time-
pieces per year in the United States. Id. at 1329.
110 The court critically questioned whether such a multifactored analysis is appropri-
ate for determining whether to pierce the corporate veil, observing:
It would be helpful were the law to provide some grand jurisdictional ledger
sheets upon which formal points such as these could be assigned weights and
totaled up. That is not possible in our real world where so much depends on
nuances, or on a sense of interrelationships and on a realistic appraisal of
subtle economic and power connections. Real rather than formal relation-
ships must be considered.
Id. at 1340.
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manufacturing or research facilities of its subsidiaries, to refute the
implication that its control over its subsidiaries was substantial
enough to sustain jurisdiction and perhaps liability. The court based
its jurisdictional analysis on an agency theory and noted that Hattori
sought market penetration for its products through the use of sub-
sidiary corporations."' The result, however, represents enterprise
analysis principles.
Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp.,112 a breach of
contract and warranty action, followed Hattori reasoning to permit
jurisdiction over a foreign parent through its domestic subsidiary.
The court found jurisdiction over Toshiba-Japan because it con-
ducted business through its wholly owned subsidiary and derived
substantial profits from the United States market."13 The court ex-
pressly rejected the argument that the foreign parent could insulate
itself from jurisdiction by creating a subsidiary, and held that where
the parent must approve significant domestic subsidiary decisions,
exercising jurisdiction over the parent is appropriate." t4
In Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. 115 plaintiff sued Volkswagen of
Germany (VWAG) for injuries caused in California by an allegedly
defective car. The vehicle had numerous owners prior to plaintiff.
The court determined, however, that VWAG was present in South
Carolina for jurisdictional purposes through Volkswagen of America
(VWOA), its United States importer. " 6 The court rejected a Cannon
defense raised by VWAG that a parent could not be subject to federal
jurisdiction on the basis of its subsidiary's activities, and instead
found jurisdiction on the basis of fundamental fairness and due pro-
cess.11 7 Roorda permits manufacturers to make a trade-off when they
I I I Judge Weinstein found that "these subsidiaries almost by definition are doing for
their parent what their parent would otherwise have to do on its own. . . . [T]he subsidi-
aries' presence substitutes for the presence of the parent." Id. at 1342.
112 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983).
113 Id. at 320.
114 Id. at 320, 324. Accord Brunwswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 575 F. Supp.
1412, 1422 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (existence of parent-subsidiary relationships alone will not
support jurisdiction over nonresident parent, but forum contact and substantial subsidiary
activities under parental control in forum state will suffice). It should be noted that Cop-
perweld presumes such control exists and will be exercised.
''5 481 F. Supp. 868 (D.S.C. 1979). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
116 Id. at 870-71.
117 To support its decision, the Roorda court noted:
This court is not unmindful that the defense of litigation in a foreign jurisdic-
tion is a burdensome inconvenience for any foreign corporation. However,
such inconvenience is a part of the price that may properly be demanded of
any corporation that extensively engages in international trade. When a for-
eign parent corporation so pervasively controls the activities of its subsidiary
as the control exercised here by VWAG over VWOA, and consideration is
given to the tremendous benefits from the business obtained through such a
relationship, a foreign corporation like VWAG should not be heard to com-
plain about the burden of defending litigation in this forum.
Id. at 881.
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choose to do business through subsidiaries by relinquishing control
over the subsidiary in return for the protection of limited liability.
Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines (ALIA) 1" 8 represents one of the
more unusual departures from the limited liability doctrine. Plaintiff
filed suit against ALIA and Arab Wings, a foreign air charter corpo-
ration predominantly owned by ALIA, for a wrongful death allegedly
caused by Arab Wings negligence during a flight abroad. Evidence
indicated that Arab Wings never had any direct contact with the
United States and that it maintained a fair degree of autonomy from
ALIA. It received much of its business, however, through ALIA's
marketing activities on its behalf in the United States, including
prominent advertisements in the Wall Street Journal." 9 The court
therefore determined that jurisdiction over Arab Wings existed on
the basis of an agency relationship.' 20
These cases essentially rejected the entity view in favor of enter-
prise analysis to resolve personal jurisdiction disputes involving alien
parent corporations, although enterprise analysis was not expressly
mentioned in the opinions. The cases strike heavy blows against the
shield of limited liability, because the courts did not pierce under-
capitalized shells, but pierced fully operational marketing and sales
corporations. This is destruction, rather than piercing of the veil,
because most subsidiary corporations perform some service for the
parents by mere existence. Copperweld supports a theory that a wholly
owned domestic corporation is its parent for practical purposes be-
cause it lacks separate legal identity. Many courts have not accepted
this view, however, and it does not appear likely they will do so.
Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp.,121 an asbestos products liability ac-
tion, is a clear recent example of the rejection of enterprise analysis
in favor of entity analysis. In Hargrave the question arose whether
under the forum state's law, a British parent's wholly owned Ameri-
can subsidiary could subject the parent to personal jurisdiction on
the basis of the relationship.' 22 Although recognizing that a close
parent-subsidiary relationship could support doing business jurisdic-
tion over the parent, the court observed that the parental policy-
making authority "was no more than that appropriate for a sole
shareholder of a corporation."1 23
118 502 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
119 id. at 859-60.
120 Id. at 858-60.
121 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983).
122 The Hargrave court reiterated the traditional rule that "[g]enerally, a foreign par-
ent corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsid-
iary is present or doing business there; the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary
relationship is not sufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction." Id. at 1159 (citing 2
J. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 4.25[6], at 4-272 (2d ed. 1984)).
123 Id. at 1161.
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Samuels v. BMW of North America, Inc. 124 reached a similar result.
Plaintiff sued the foreign manufacturer and its domestic affiliate for
injuries caused by allegedly defective brakes. The court concluded
that even when a foreign parent maintains all its commercial contacts
in the forum through its domestic subsidiary, it is unreasonable to
subject the parent to personal jurisdiction if the plaintiff had full
right of redress against the subsidiary, unless the parent was a neces-
sary party to the dispute. 125
The veil-piercing analysis in Samuels is probably unsound. The
facts indicate that, but for the presence of its subsidiary, the parent
would have been doing all of its own business in the forum. It is
difficult to ascertain how the manufacturer avoids becoming a neces-
sary party to such a case, because its subsidiary would have less
knowledge of the brake manufacturing activities allegedly responsi-
ble for the injury than the parent. This may be one of the few in-
stances in which a court determined that the presence of a solvent
defendant meets the needs ofjustice, and saw no need to pierce the
veil.
In Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd. 126 plaintiff, a Califor-
nia British Leyland dealer, sued various affiliates of British Leyland,
Ltd. of Great Britain, as well as the parent for illegally conspiring to
deprive him of the dealership.' 27 The court rejected an agency the-
ory of jurisdiction, as well as an alter ego argument raised by plain-
tiff, on the ground that plaintiff failed to show that British Leyland
exercised actual control over the affiliates' conduct. The court also
refused to find jurisdiction based on the parent's contacts in the
United States, which existed solely through subsidiary corporations,
despite evidence indicating that British Leyland approved of the
challenged marketing plan. 128 The holding is based on the finding
that the various subsidiaries exercised autonomy over their market-
ing activities, and on concern over British Government ownership of
most British Leyland stock. 129 Kramer Motors conflicts with cases
such as Hattori and Toshiba, which found implied control sufficient to
support exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alien parent. It nev-
ertheless reflects the tendency of some courts to show greater defer-
ence to separate incorporation as a bar to piercing the veil in the
absence of a strong showing that justice compels otherwise.
This tendency, rooted in Cannon principles, cannot be recon-
124 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
125 Id. at 1193-94.
126 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062 (1981).
127 Id. Defendants included British Leyland, its foreign marketing subsidiary (also a
British corporation), its United States importing subsidiary, and an American dealership
wholly owned by the parent.
128 Id. at 1177-78.
129 Id.
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ciled with decisions that reach contrary results, because in most such
cases the multinational company defendants are highly integrated,
closely coordinated unitary structures engaged in commercial activi-
ties through affiliated corporations in the forum. In virtually all of
these cases, the legal disputes could not have arisen absent parental
control over the conduct resulting in the injury. Applying enterprise
analysis is a means of achieving consistent results, and there is little
justification for lack of personal jurisdiction dismissals where parent
corporations engage in substantial business activities in the United
States through separately incorporated business entities. Adoption
of the enterprise proposal would not affect the constitutional re-
quirement that the domestic affiliate be amenable to personal juris-
diction in the forum under a minimum contracts-transacting
business or even under a doing business standard, nor would it alter
a sovereign's right to narrow the scope of parental jurisdiction by
statute.
IV. Survey of Multinational Corporation Veil-Piercing Disputes by
Area
A. Unitary Tax Litigation and the Enterprise Theory
The principal group of cases adopting enterprise analysis in-
volves multinational company challenges to the rights of states to
apportion state tax liability on the basis of global income "[w]ithout
regard to entity and the class of corporate structure."130 Various
states partially calculate state tax liability on the basis of worldwide
income reporting, which computes a corporation's tax base by total-
ling the income of all the corporation's affiliates throughout the
world that comprise the "unitary business."'' A domestic corpora-
tion's apportionable tax base thus includes nonrepatriated foreign
source income of its foreign affiliates.' 3 2
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes' 33 the Supreme Court
carved out a broad exception to the limited liability doctrine other-
wise applicable to the individual corporate affiliates of a transna-
tional company. It rejected the constitutional challenge to a state
assessment against a corporation doing business in the state on the
basis of income from its corporate affiliates outside the state. Find-
ing that Mobil was one large economically integrated taxation unit,
the Court rejected Mobil's arguments that a state should not be al-
lowed to tax the activities of Mobil's foreign affiliates either because
they lacked any meaningful nexus with the state or because such tax-
ation impedes United States foreign commerce. The Court further
130 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 22.03.5, at 439.
131 Note, supra note 28, at 96.
132 Id.
133 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
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noted that for tax calculation purposes, a state could look to "contri-
butions to income resulting from functional integration, centraliza-
tion of management, and economies of scale."' 34
The Court ruled that Mobil had the burden of showing that the
"foreign operations of its subsidiaries and affiliates are distinct in any
business or economic sense from its petroleum sales activities in Ver-
mont."' 13 5 In language specifically directed at the multinational cor-
poration controlled by a holding company, the Court determined
that "[s]o long as dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates reflect
profits derived from a functionally integrated enterprise, those divi-
dends are income to the parent earned in a unitary business. One
must look principally at the underlying activity, not the form of investment," to
determine tax liability.' 3 6
Shortly after deciding Mobil, the Court reviewed a somewhat
similar state tax law in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Reve-
nue. 13 7 It concluded that a state constitutionally may impose taxes
on an entire enterprise if the entity functions as "a highly integrated
business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized management
and controlled interaction."' 1 8 Mobil and Exxon thus laid the
groundwork for a legal liability rule premised on the unitary business
concept by treating the parent and subsidiary corporations as one
entity if characterized by common ownership and operations that re-
sult in high levels of functional integration, centralized management,
and economies of scale.' 3 9
Two years after Exxon and Mobil, the Court again reviewed the
unitary business issue in Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission140
and F. W Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New
York.141 Asarco involved state calculation of a domestic corporation's
tax liability on passive income paid by overseas corporations to their
domestic affiliate within a large mining conglomerate. While the
Court reaffirmed its Mobil-Exxon support of the legality of unitary
business tax liability as "the linchpin of apportionability in the field,"
it nevertheless voided the state's inclusion of Asarco dividends, in-
terest, and capital gains income from foreign affiliates. It held that
these affiliates were "discrete business enterprises" 142 insufficiently
134 Id. at 438.
135 Id. at 439.
136 Id. at 440 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court stated that the form of business
organization may have nothing to do with the underlying unity of diversity of business
enterprise. [When one chooses] to operate its foreign subsidiaries as separate divisions of
a legally as well as a functionally integrated enterprise, there is little doubt" that imposi-
tion of tax liability on such an enterprise would be legal. Id. at 440-41.
137 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
138 Id. at 224.
139 Note, supra note 28, at 118.
140 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
141 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
142 See Asarco, 458 U.S. at 321-22.
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connected with the forum to constitute a unitary business with the
domestic affiliate.
The domestic corporation in Asarco shared few common officers
or key employees with the affiliates, infrequently engaged in com-
mercial transactions with them, and in some instances, either con-
tractually waived its right to exercise voting control over or owned
only a minority of shares of the affiliates.' 43 The Court's principal
concern was whether apportionment and taxation on such income
would violate due process.' 44 The Court found no outward func-
tional integration connecting the foreign affiliates' activities to the
taxing state, and thus rejected the unitary theory as a basis for
liability. 145
Woolworth involved the somewhat different issue whether a state
could tax a domestic retailing corporation on the basis of "potential"
business benefits from the assets and income of its overseas retailing
affiliates accrued by ownership of the affiliates' stock. The Court
found virtually no functional integration among domestic and for-
eign affiliates, because the latter had substantial autonomy over all
important business decisions, including those related to finance, per-
sonnel, and management. 146 The Court further concluded that re-
tailing companies, unlike petroleum enterprises, were probably not
suited to treatment as unitary businesses. 14
Subsequent to Asarco and Woolworth, the Court again addressed
the unitary taxation issue in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Board.148 It upheld the lower court's findings that a unitary business
existed because of close financial interrelationships between domes-
tic and foreign affiliates. There was also close parental involvement
in the foreign affiliate's managerial affairs through establishment of
"general standards of professionalism, profitability and ethical prac-
tices" by domestic corporation officers charged with overseeing their
143 See id. at 320-24.
144 See id. at 326.
145 See id. In a significant aspect of the opinion, the Court rejected the state's argu-
ment that a common corporate purpose, manifested by transfer of intangible income to
enhance the profitability and overall economic well-being of the domestic parent, was suf-
ficient to define unitary business. The Court stated:
This definition of unitary business would destroy the concept. The business
of a corporation requires that it earn money to continue operations and to
provide a return on its invested capital. Consequently, all of its operations,
including any investment made, in some sense can be said to be "for pur-
poses related to or contributing to the [corporation's] business." When
pressed to its logical limit, this conception of the unitary business limitation
becomes no limitation at all. When less ambitious interpretations are em-
ployed, the result is simply arbitrary.
Id. at 326.
146 Id. at 367-68.
147 Id.
148 103 S. Ct. 2933 (1983).
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subsidiaries' operations.' 49 The Court seemed particularly im-
pressed with the "flow of value" argument that parental provision of
low interest loans, free technical assistance and services, and imposi-
tion of management standards combined to meet a reasonable uni-
tary business finding. It also rejected the company's efforts to
require a "substantial flow of goods" as a prerequisite to such a
finding. 150
Distinguishing the Supreme Court unitary business decisions is
not as easy as it appears at first glance. A unitary business may be
found for state tax liability purposes if a domestic corporation has
both the power to control its overseas subsidiary's activities and ex-
ercises that power; if parental and subsidiary business operations are
closely integrated, as manifested by liberal intra-enterprise transfers
of personnel, capital, goods or services, and cash flow; and if it ap-
pears that the subsidiaries are dependent upon the domestic affiliate
for continued existence, or vice versa. These conditions are proba-
bly more likely to characterize manufacturing companies that market
and distribute their own products, and are less likely to characterize
retailing companies or enterprises that have high levels of local sub-
sidiary autonomy.
Several state courts have ruled on the legality of unitary tax
schemes within the context of the Supreme Court guidelines. 15 1
One such decision rejects the argument that a conglomerate that ex-
ists principally to acquire and divest other companies can constitute
a unitary business on the basis of common identity among its affiliate
companies accompanied by upward profit flow to the conglomer-
ate. 152 This rejection of the Container Corp. "flow of value" reasoning
could make it difficult for any business, other than a completely and
vertically integrated one, to meet the unitary business definition.
Foreign-based multinational companies subject to unitary business
tax treatment have thus far unsuccessfully argued that they should be
treated as a unitary business for other purposes, a view that is con-
ceptually sound in light of Copperweld.153
149 Id. at 2944.
150 Id. at 2947.
151 See, e.g., Comm'r of Revenue v. Associated Dry Goods, 347 N.W.2d 36 (Minn.
1984) (appeal pending); PMD Investment Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 216 Neb. 553, 345
N.W.2d 815 (1984); Comptroller v. Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 58 Md. App. 327, 473 A.2d
469 (1984); Brown Group, Inc. v. Admin. Hearing Comm'n, 649 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc).
152 James v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 654 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
153 See Capitol Industries-EMI v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1087 (1982). See also Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Dep't of Revenue, 724 F.2d 1294 (7th
Cir. 1984); Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
noma. Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Franchotti, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1984); EMI Ltd. v. Bennett, 560 F.
Supp. 134 (N.D. Cal. 1982), a'd, 738 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1984). Each of the above courts
held that a foreign parent corporation did not have standing to sue for indirect harm suf-
fered from taxation of a domestic subsidiary.
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Enterprise analysis of veil-piercing issues is consistent with the
unitary tax scheme adopted by the Supreme Court with certain mod-
ification. This scheme presumes the unitary nature of a mul-
ticorporate, multinational business entity for liability and
jurisdictional purposes given sufficient functional economic integra-
tion levels and a reasonable nexus between forum and nonforum
commercial activites. The Court's unitary tax scheme is not alto-
gether ideal for analyzing other types of transnational veil-piercing
issues, however, because of the tendency to find unitary businesses
only among vertically integrated manufacturers and not among most
other types of companies. Furthermore, unitary tax assessment fo-
rum nexus requirements cannot be easily equated with constitutional
personal jurisdiction prerequisites in nontax cases, because the latter
are far more easily satisfied. Nonetheless, the unitary business analy-
sis developed by the Court in these tax cases offers a sound concep-
tual starting point for resolving transnational corporate veil-piercing
disputes by enterprise analysis.
B. American Judicial Enforcement Proceedings and Discovery Issues
Two categories of litigation have arisen over the extent to which
United States laws and judicial power may penalize domestic corpo-
rations and their foreign affiliates for failure of either or both to com-
ply with court orders resulting from conduct abroad by the foreign
affiliates. The first involves efforts by United States government
agencies to obtain information relevant to federal tax, antitrust, se-
curities, or other types of investigations that can subject corporate
members of an enterprise group to potential criminal as well as civil
liability. The second category of cases involves judicial sanctions im-
posed for failure of private litigants to comply with discovery re-
quests or orders.
In general, a parent corporation lawfully before a federal court
cannot refuse to respond to discovery requests regarding informa-
tion or documentation of a subsidiary merely because the latter is
not a party. In such a situation, as long as common control exists
between or among affiliates subject to the dispute, the court will im-
pose a compliance duty. 154 Where discovery is to be conducted
abroad or has extraterritorial legal consequences, courts must also
consider the policies and interests of foreign states to determine if
discovery is appropriate, especially when foreign law forbids discov-
ery compliance. 55 When noncompliance results from a corpora-
tion's unwillingness to violate foreign law, courts generally assess the
strength of such reasoning in determining imposition of noncompli-
ance sanctions, but almost always require discovery compliance re-
154 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 10.03 to 10.03.3, at 240-44 & n.19.
155 d., § 10.04.1, at 245-47.
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gardless of foreign law consequences, as well as disregarding the
corporate entity.
United States v. Vetco' 56 illustrates the extent to which federal law
may reach the activities of foreign affiliates of United States corpora-
tions. Vetco involved the issue whether a federal court should enforce
a summons from the Internal Revenue Service in a criminal tax in-
vestigation of an American corporation and its Swiss subsidiary. 157
Vetco refused to disclose essential financial data about the subsidiary
on the ground that to do so would violate Swiss laws, which bar such
disclosure by or about Swiss business enterprises. 158 The court re-
jected Vetco's foreign illegality defense and balanced the competing
interests of the Swiss Government in requiring secrecy against those
of the United States in requiring disclosure.' 59 It found that Vetco
failed to prove it could be successfully prosecuted in Switzerland for
its acts performed in the United States, or that anyone allegedly pro-
tected by the Swiss confidentiality statutes would legitimately protest
disclosure.160
In another California federal tax case, United States v. Toyota Mo-
tor Corp., 161 the IRS issued a summons for information to Toyota's
Japanese parent following an audit of that corporation's business ac-
tivities with its American subsidiary. 162 Toyota-Japan challenged the
personal jurisdiction of the court, but the court ruled that an agency
or alter ego jurisdictional analysis has no relationship to a congres-
sional mandate that personal jurisdiction be exercised over a corpo-
ration for IRS summons enforcement purposes wherever such
corporation is "found" in the broadest possible sense.' 63 By impos-
ing jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the basis of whether it
is "found" in the forum, Congress virtually assures an automatic
156 644 F.2d 1324, modified, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
157 The Internal Revenue Code provides that foreign subsidiaries predominantly
owned by American parents are subject to federal tax liability. I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (1975).
158 Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code provides for a fine and imprisonment for dis-
closure of business secrets by or about Swiss businesses to foreign government agencies.
Vetco also claimed that an agreement between the United States and Switzerland, the
Convention on Double Taxation of Income, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, 2
U.S.T. 1751, 1760-61, T.I.A.S. No. 2316, art. XVI(3), prohibited tax enforcement meas-
ures by one country when they conflicted with the public laws or policies of the other. The
court here narrowly construed this provision to avoid its application to the case.
159 See Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1286-91.
160 In an inconspicuous footnote with interesting future implications, the court noted
that while the United States Government merited considerable judicial deference to valid
enforcement of governmental policies, private litigants might not receive the same degree
of deference. See id. at 1289 n.9.
161 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
162 The IRS issued the summons pursuant to its statutory powers to conduct tax audits
of two or more companies engaged in joint business activities. See I.R.C. § 482 (1975).
163 26 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976). See Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. at 357-59 (provid-
ing that the IRS may bring a petition to enforce a summons in the "district court for the
district in which [the person summoned] resides or is found").
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piercing of the corporate veil in federal tax liability cases if the cor-
poration has a domestic affiliate there.
The most prominent of the growing number of grand jury cases
involving various affiliates of the multinational enterprise is In re
Marc Rich & Co. v. United States.164 The federal government decided
to investigate the tax consequences of various global petroleum and
commodities transactions engaged in by the numerous alien and do-
mestic affiliate corporations controlled by Marc Rich and his busi-
ness associates. The investigation eventually was turned over to a
grand jury, which issued a subpoena duces tecum to the principal
American subsidiary, ordering production of all documents and
records applicable to the tax consequences of the entire company's
petroleum transactions. The American subsidiary refused to comply,
and the district court issued a contempt order against both the sub-
sidiary and its principal Swiss affiliate. The Second Circuit found
subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of potentially adverse forum
effects caused by the alleged tax nonpayment, thus reaffirming prin-
ciples of territorial effects and protective jurisdiction. 165 The court
then found personal jurisdiction over the Swiss corporation on the
basis of its close ties to the American affiliate and the commission of
at least one forum act through the latter in the furtherance of a
conspiracy. 166
As in Vetco, the Swiss corporation in Marc Rich argued that sub-
mission of the records by the foreign parent would violate Swiss se-
crecy laws, and that a grand jury proceeding was an inappropriate
means of seeking production or supporting a contempt order based
upon failure to produce the documents. The court made short shrift
of these arguments: "It would be strange, indeed, if the United
States could punish a foreign corporation for violating its criminal
laws . . .but a federal grand jury could not investigate to ascertain
the probability that a crime had taken place."' 167 The grand jury can
essentially trigger the exercise of subject matter and personal juris-
diction over a foreign corporation through its domestic affiliate by
finding that adverse forum effects occurred in part through con-
certed action between the two entities.
It should not be assumed, however, that government investiga-
tions will always result in sanctions for failure of domestic or foreign
corporate affiliates to comply with enforcement proceedings. In
United States v. First National Bank of Chicago 168 the Seventh Circuit
reversed a lower court summons enforcement order for an American
164 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3555 (1983).
165 Id. at 666-67.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 666 (citations omitted). Accord SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
168 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
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bank to produce certain tax-related documentation from its Greek
branch. The bank showed that compliance would probably subject
its Greek employees, and anyone else subject to Greek jurisdiction,
to serious criminal penalties. The court did order the American
bank to make a good faith compliance effort by seeking a waiver from
prosecution, a normal means of dealing with the foreign law prose-
cution defense.1 69
It is generally necessary to make a good faith effort to prove, by
the testimony of expert foreign counsel, that compliance with the or-
der is actually a violation of foreign law and will likely result in prose-
cution. It is also necessary to seek a judicial or foreign governmental
prosecution waiver.170 Even when these steps are taken, however,
some federal courts may still decide that United States law enforce-
ment policies deserve greater deference than foreign legal consider-
ations. In a recent IRS summons enforcement proceeding against a
major New York bank to obtain Hong Kong banking records, the
court acknowledged that compliance might result in violation of
Hong Kong bank secrecy laws. It nonetheless concluded that "the
interest of the United States in enforcing its tax laws significantly out-
weighs Hong Kong's interest in preserving bank secrecy."' 7 '
In United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 172 the court was
more reluctant to pierce the corporate veil to impose potential crimi-
nal liability on an American parent for the conduct of its Swiss sub-
sidiary. Firestone created a wholly owned Swiss banking corporation
to handle various European and Eurodollar transactions. When the
bank began buying and selling gold through its self-created broker-
age firms, the United States Government launched an investigation
of Firestone in the United States for potential violations of the Gold
Act of 1934.173 The bank, which was found to control the brokerage
firms, had acted in strict compliance with Swiss banking law and had
not applied for a license because disclosure of certain information on
the permit forms would have run afoul of Swiss banking confidential-
ity statutes. The court held that the Government failed to prove that
169 Id. at 345.
170 Id. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has rejected this defense on several occasions.
See United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723 (11 th Cir. 1984) (defense denied where American
corporation failed to enforce agreement to turn over documents in foreign court); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3086
(1983) (defense denied where foreign bank failed to seek judicial waiver of secrecy laws to
permit financial records production).
171 Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Accord In re
Grand Jury 81-2, 550 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (fact that bank records were in Ger-
many did not put them beyond jurisdictional reach of grand jury subpoenas and orders of
district court given continuous and systematic presence of bank in the United States).
172 518 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
173 The Gold Act barred gold speculation by persons subject to American law who
failed to obtain a license from the Treasury Department. See 31 U.S.C. § 442 (1970) (re-
pealed). See also 31 C.F.R. § 54.1-.83 (1970) for regulations then in effect.
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the bank, and thus the brokerage houses, were in fact instrumentali-
ties of the parent, rather than affiliates with which the parent con-
ducted arms-length dealings.' 74 Because Swiss law prohibited
Firestone from interfering in any way with the bank's gold transac-
tions, the court presumed that Firestone maintained its corporate
distance in the absence of contrary evidence.' 75
Firestone is not easily reconciled with the Vetco and Toyota line of
cases. Firestone suggests that the unitary business theory used to im-
pose tax liability in Mobil and Exxon may not apply when the enter-
prise can show that its affiliates constitute legally autonomous units
in their respective countries of incorporation, but this seems to be
nothing more than judicial preference for the form of appearance
over the substance of actual conduct.
Theoretically, there should be little difference between noncom-
pliance with a discovery order in an enforcement proceeding and a
similar order in civil litigation involving private parties. For exam-
ple, in Soletanche and Rodio, Inc. v. Brown and Lambrecht Earth Movers,
Inc. , 176 a patent infringement suit brought by the American subsidi-
ary of a French parent, which owned the patent and licensed its use
to the plaintiff, the court ordered the parent to respond to defend-
ant's interrogatories, although such disclosure violated French trade
secrets laws. The court found that waivers from prosecution could
be obtained by executive order and gave the parent time to seek
them before imposing sanctions. 177 As Vetco suggests, however,
courts probably will be more willing to render decisions that conflict
with the laws of another sovereign at the request of their own sover-
eign than in response to private legal disputes.
A particularly heated controversy has erupted over the extent to
which American litigation discovery abroad must comply with the
Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters.'178 Hague Convention decisions are important
174 518 F. Supp. at 1040.
175 Id. at 1039-40.
176 99 F.R.D. 269 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
177 Id. at 272-73.
178 Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (text reprinted at 28 U.S.C. § 1781
(Supp. 1981)). Some courts have ruled that the party seeking such discovery must adhere
to the Convention rules regarding the taking of evidence through letters rogatory even
when the foreign country law may well bar compliance, on the theory that the Convention
is an international agreement binding upon the United States. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v.
American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Other courts have reached con-
trary results by reasoning that "it is a mistake ... to view the Convention as an interna-
tional agreement to protect foreign nations from American discovery when they are
parties properly before American courts" because the Convention and Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery are in 'fundamental conflict with one another' and
thus force the court to choose the latter over the former to protect its jurisdictional pow-
ers." See Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519-20 (N.D. 111. 1984); see also Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Union de Transports Aenens, No. 83-2291, slip op. at - (D.D.C. June 26,
1984) (a foreign court that lacks jurisdiction of underlying controversy has no valid basis
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
in transnational veil-piercing cases because, generally, the foreign
corporation seeking to invoke the Convention does so as the national
of a country that has adopted its provision to authorize that country's
court to reject letters rogatory when to accept them would violate
local discovery blocking statutes.1 79 Thus, the foreign corporation
argues that the Hague Convention binds the United States to submit
its judicial discovery orders to courts of a country that must legally
refuse to honor them. Rejecting applicability of the Convention, one
federal court noted that the blocking statutes of a country can consti-
tute a "serious disability," because it will force the American court to
apply all necessary sanctions for protection of its own powers and
jurisdiction. 180
Enterprise analysis probably already has its broadest application
in traditional corporate veil-piercing enforcement and discovery pro-
ceedings. The enterprise theory is generally the rule rather than the
exception in such instances and, as seen in Marc Rich and Toyota,
courts will not have difficulty exercising jurisdiction over all the affili-
ates, foreign and domestic, engaged in conduct having adverse fo-
rum effects. Because exercise ofjurisdiction in such circumstances is
constitutionally permissible, decisions relying upon Cannon as sup-
port for rejection of such jurisdiction may not be sound. Finally,fo-
rum non conveniens dismissal is also present, although on grounds
related to international comity rather than convenience.
C. Federal Antitrust Litigation
There are two categories of legal developments related to trans-
national corporate veil-piercing in federal antitrust litigation. In the
first category are issues left unresolved by the Copperweld decision,
which eliminated one source of contention in multinational veil-
piercing antitrust litigation by abrogating the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine for a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. After
Copperweld, it is unclear whether two corporations, affiliated through
some, but not total common ownership and direction, can unlawfully
conspire with one another in violation of the Sherman Act.i 81 The
for displacing decision-making authority of the U.S. courts with regard to U.S. laws and
effect of treaty on litigation); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (Hague Convention did not supersede the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-existence of federal jurisdiction over a foreign entity subjects
that entity, like any other litigant, to the provisions of the Federal Rules).
179 See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 254-55.
180 Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 527.
181 Copperweld left essentially intact previous antitrust decisions imposing liability upon
the various affiliate corporations of a multinational enterprise. See Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), which involved an American corporate defend-
ant that owned substantial numbers of shares in its French and British affiliates, also de-
fendants. The Court found that these defendants committed federal antitrust violations by
colluding with one another to allocate markets, fix each others' prices, and work to fore-
close outside competitors in each others' markets. The Court based its finding on intra-
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answer may depend upon traditional corporate veil-piercing analysis
to determine whether the affiliated corporations acted independently
and separately from one another, despite common ownership and
direction. Thus, antitrust conspiracy liability in such instances could
depend upon the extent to which one affiliate has "effective working
control" over the other, or whether the two retain independence and
arm's length distance from one another, a result that Copperweld im-
plicitly seeks to avoid.' 8 2
Also unclear after Copperweld is the extent to which "effective
working control" or some higher economic integration among affili-
ated corporations can subject the entire enterprise to liability for the
conduct of any one component. The Copperweld Court determined
that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary constitute one business
enterprise with common goals and purposes. This classic enterprise
analysis situation supports the view that the anticompetitive conduct
of the subsidiary can subject its parent to antitrust liability merely on
the basis of ownership.
There is no reasonable basis for concluding that a court cannot
reach a similar result whenever it finds that one affiliate controls an-
other through stock ownership and perhaps some common director
and management personnel. Such a result would not be inconsistent
with Copperweld, which supports the view that affiliated corporations
may now be considered one economic and legal entity for antitrust
liability purposes. Until the courts clarify this area, the issue
promises to spawn extensive litigation, particularly in foreign com-
merce antitrust disputes involving domestic and foreign affiliates.
The second category of federal antitrust trends and develop-
ments in the multinational corporate veil-piercing area involves the
few recent foreign commerce decisions that use enterprise analysis at
the expense of entity theory. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp. 183 the Supreme Court determined that private parties
enterprise liability even though the lower court concluded with extensive fact-finding that
the three corporations had retained arm's length distances from one another. See United
States v. Timken Rollers Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1949). The Timken
intra-enterprise liability conclusion is probably no longer valid because of Copperweld, but
the more interesting issue is whether the lower court fact-finding could support liability
under § 1 of the Sherman Act against these affiliates, which appeared as collaborating
competitors rather than functionally dependent entities of a single enterprise even though
they in fact acted as one. Copperweld noted that the gist of the antitrust violation in Timken
may have been the common stock ownership and suggested that a different result might
have been reached if the case were reheard. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2739 n. 11.
182 See, e.g., ANTITRUST DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE
FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Jan. 26, 1977), Case A, reprinted in P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS 1236, 1241-43 (3d ed. 1981), which uses an effective working control test in
foreign commerce antitrust cases brought by the Department. For an illustration of how
such a test might be judicially applied, see Brager Co. v. Leumi Securities Corp., 429 F.
Supp. 1341, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
183 370 U.S. 690 (1962). This decision conflicts with Alcoa, an earlier case in which the
Canadian affiliate was found to be within the court's jurisdiction and subject to liability for
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could attack the anticompetitive conduct of foreign affiliates of
American-based multinational corporations through the parents.
The case never reached final disposition, but the reported opinion
left little doubt that Union Carbide could be found liable for its for-
eign affiliate's Canadian vanadium monopoly on the basis of an-
ticompetitive effects in the United States.' 8 4
This extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law
strongly affects the potential legal liability of foreign parent corpora-
tions. In Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui Co., 185 for ex-
ample, the Fifth Circuit's opinion potentially curtails the application
of a limited liability rule to the foreign-based transnational enter-
prise with domestic affiliates whenever the foreign and domestic affil-
iates conspire with other defendants to commit an antitrust violation.
Mitsui is probably consistent with Copperweld, because the former
would attribute the acts of a parent and its subsidiary to one another
whenever either conspires with other parties to commit acts that
would benefit the enterprise as a whole.' 8 6
In analyzing the corporate relationships within plaintiffs' and de-
fendants' respective enterprises, Mitsui makes several significant ob-
servations. The court determined that even though only plaintiffs
Hong Kong subsidiaries suffered direct harm by being excluded
from Indonesia, it would nonetheless pierce the corporate veils of
the plaintiff to permit parental recovery for harm to its subsidiaries
abroad. I8 7 The court refused to rule on whether the Japanese cor-
poration sufficiently restrained American foreign commerce to sat-
isfy Sherman Act subject matter jurisdiction on the effects principle
because there had been no finding on the merits.'18  If the trial court
finds an affirmative answer to this issue on remand, it must decide
whether the Sherman Act can realistically govern the conduct of for-
eign corporations abroad when they engage in American foreign
its participation in the global aluminum cartel. The Continental Ore court nonetheless re-
fused to impute liability to the American parent. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 392-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (trial court opinion on remand).
184 Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 710.
185 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244, reafd, 704 F.2d 785 (1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1984).
186 Plaintiffs, an American parent and its two Hong Kong subsidiaries, sued ajapanese
parent and its American subsidiary, as well as unaffiliated Indonesian business associa-
tions, for conspiring to keep plaintiffs out of the Indonesian tree harvesting and lumber
exporting businesses. After protracted procedural battles lasting several years, in which
the district court twice dismissed the case on various grounds only to be reversed each
time on appeal, the Fifth Circuit reached several important legal conclusions. It deter-
mined that both the American plaintiff and the American defendant were in the lumber
import business so that any competition for overseas supply sources sufficiently affected
United States foreign commerce for antitrust purposes. Mitsui, the Japanese parent de-
fendant, as an alleged co-conspirator with its domestic subsidiary, thus became subject to
federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 877.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 883-84.
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commerce through American subsidiaries. This characterizes almost
every foreign parent corporation with domestic subsidiaries, and
thus, these issues have extremely important future consequences.
Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh and Co. (America), 189 an-
other foreign commerce antitrust case still unresolved on the merits,
involved claims against various Japanese steel manufacturers and
their American subsidiary corporations. Three of the Japanese de-
fendants had no contact with the United States other than through
wholly owned domestic subsidiaries. The court found, however, that
the Japanese defendants were within its jurisdiction under United
States v. Scophony Corp. ,190 which attributes a subsidiary's activities to
its parent when the latter sufficiently controls and supervises them.
The court also concluded that the foreign defendants could probably
be sued on the basis of the American business transacted through
their domestic subsidiaries, a ruling consistent with traditional anti-
trust principles. 19 '
The Cascade court developed a test for determining when a for-
eign parent is susceptible to federal antitrust liability and jurisdiction
on the basis of its subsidiary's American presence and activities.
This test, which is identical to that used in the subsequent Chrysler-
General Motors joint venture litigation, 192 is based primarily upon pa-
rental control and supervision over subsidiary activities, regardless
of whether the activities are the source of the litigation. While this
test may be too restrictive in light of Copperweld, which arguably
makes even the subsidiary's mere forum presence that of its parent,
courts may not be ready to make "presence" and "transacting busi-
ness" synonymous. If "presence" and "transacting business" are sy-
nonymous for antitrust personal jurisdiction purposes, a foreign
parent may have an incentive to refrain from creating domestic sub-
sidiaries that are likely to increase parental amenability to suit.
Even when personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign affiliate,
antitrust subject matter jurisdiction requirements must be met by a
finding of adverse impact upon American foreign commerce. In
189 499 F. Supp. 829 (D. Ore. 1980).
190 333 U.S. 795, 814 (1948).
191 Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982), provides that federal anti-
trust suits may be brought wherever a corporation "transacts" business, and foreign cor-
porations generally transact business in a forum with or through their forum affiliates, to
the extent there are any.
192 The elements of the test include: (1) whether the parent and subsidiary have
formed a partnership to compete on a worldwide basis; (2) whether the parent can influ-
ence the subsidiary in matters with antitrust consequences; (3) whether there is an inte-
grated manufacturing, sales, and distribution system; and (4) whether the subsidiary is the
parent's marketing arm, with common trademarks and advertising. Cascade, 499 F. Supp.
at 838. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 402 F. Supp. 262, 327-28
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (court found these elements existing in most of the parent-subsidiary
relationships).
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Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc.,193 for example, the court dis-
missed a federal antitrust claim brought by a Canadian plaintiff
against various American corporations that had allegedly conspired
with their Canadian affiliates to boycott plaintiff's Canadian transac-
tions, because of insufficient effects upon American foreign com-
merce. The court did not find that the corporate interrelationships
among the American and Canadian affiliates constituted these ef-
fects. The decision suggests that enterprise analysis may not readily
apply to anticompetitive conduct engaged in abroad by the foreign
affiliates of American corporations.' 9 4 In a more recent decision,
Eurim-Pharm v. Pfizer, Inc., 5 the court dismissed an antitrust suit
against an American parent and several of its wholly owned foreign
subsidiaries for alleged injuries to a German corporation abroad be-
cause there were no reasonably forseeable adverse effects on either
American import or export commerce.
To the extent that foreign commerce antitrust litigation involv-
ing transnational veil-piercing issues survives Copperweld and arises in
the future, it probably will be analyzed in a manner identical to that
of grand jury, tax enforcement, and discovery litigation.' 9 6 Enter-
prise analysis could therefore supersede entity analysis without dis-
rupting current legal precedent, particularly since Copperweld
eliminates a basis for any deferential treatment otherwise owed to
separate, but closely affiliated corporations. Although a court must
have personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporate defendant, this
is easily found under a transacting business standard whenever that
defendant engages in forum business through or with a domestic af-
filiate. Enterprise analysis of foreign commerce antitrust disputes is
thus compatible with current legal principles.
D. Federal Securities Litigation
Piercing the multinational corporate veil has been an issue in
recent federal securities and commodities litigation, where courts
193 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
194 Accord Conservation Council of Western Australia, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa), 518 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pa. 1981). This is consistent with congressional
intent in amending the Sherman Act. Cf Pfizer v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 309 (1978)
(determining that anticompetitive acts of American corporations by the nature of the ac-
tors' identity constituted sufficient adverse forum effects to support Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion). Does a foreign subsidary acting abroad at the instructions of its American parent
subject the parent to American antitrust liability? Should it, when the foreign subsidiary is
not violating the laws of its own country because there are none?
195 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
196 This is probably not surprising, for as Dean Blumberg observes, larger markets
such as the United States are "committed to aggressive restraints on trade practices as-
serted extraterritorially," and therefore, "the corporate transnational complex is looked
upon as a single undertaking or enterprise, [and] the formalities of corporate structure are
ignored . . . without regard to the fact that some components may be located abroad."
BLUMBERG, supra note 2, § 10.12, at 265.
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have implicitly applied enterprise rather than limited liability princi-
ples. In Dofflemyer v. W F. Hall Printing Co. 197 plaintiffs sued a Cana-
dian bank and its Bahamian branch for the latter's conduct as a
trustee voting certain shares of stock in a manner alleged to violate
federal securities laws. The court ruled that the control-based liabil-
ity statutes should be construed literally to impose liability upon the
Canadian bank for the conduct of its branch, unless one of the speci-
fied defenses applied. It further held that "the exercise of control
over the offending corporation is a sufficient contact upon which to
predicate [personal] jurisdiction" in any federal securities
litigation. 198
Tamari v. Bache Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. 199 involved a dispute arising
between foreign investors and the foreign affiliate of a domestic cor-
poration over transactions originating abroad, which resulted in
trading activities on the American commodities exchange. The court
found subject matter jurisdiction under the Commodities Exchange
Act 20 0 because the foreign corporation had acted as agent for its
American subsidiary in the solicitation, and the trading activities had
occurred on the American exchange. 20 1 The Tamari court used an
enterprise liability concept at the expense of the limited liability doc-
trine, and other courts confronted with similar facts have reached
identical results. 20 2 Foreign corporations that solicit and transact in-
vestment activities with foreign investors abroad, for trading on
American exchanges by their domestic affiliates, will usually subject
themselves and their affiliates to liability under such a broad scheme,
and separate corporate identities will be ignored.20 3
Not all courts have been as willing to pierce the corporate veil of
foreign affiliates to reach their American parent for securities activi-
ties engaged in abroad. For instance, in Fidenas A.G. v. Honeywell,
197 558 F. Supp. 372 (D. Del. 1983).
198 Id. at 386 (relying upon Sun First Nat'l Bank of Orlando v. Miller, 77 F.R.D. 430,
440 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). Federal securities statutes impose joint and several liability for vio-
lations on the basis of corporate control except where the controlling person, incorpo-
rated or otherwise, has no knowledge or reasonable basis for knowing about the actionable
conduct of the controlled person or entity, or else acts in good faith and does not induce
the conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982). Cf 7 U.S.C. § 4, which bases control on agency.
Federal antitrust statutes are silent on this point.
199 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984).
200 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (West Supp. 1984).
201 Tamari, 730 F.2d at 1108.
202 Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983); Creswell v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Securities, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
203 One court reasoned that "[t]he way to encourage foreign traders to trade on the
[domestic] . . . futures market rather than on foreign markets is to maintain a regulated
market with standards of care imposed on [domestic] commission merchants." The court
further stated that domestic traders should not be permitted to thwart such a goal "by
utilizing affiliates based in foreign countries and avoiding the standard of care owed to its
customers. Public policy dictates this conclusion." Alpa S.A. Agrindustrial Alemano v.
ACLI Int'l, 573 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (1983).
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Inc. 204 Honeywell and its various European subsidiaries became em-
broiled in various securities fraud cases for allegedly illegal conduct
occurring in both the United States and Europe. Plaintiff sought to
reach the European affiliates through their American parent in a
United States court and also sought to impose liability on Honeywell
for the acts of its subsidiaries in Switzerland. The court found that
Honeywell neither controlled, nor dominated its European affiliates
and refused to pierce the veil for liability purposes. 20 5 The court
also refused to pierce the veil for jurisdictional purposes, because
there was little impact in the United States from the activities of the
European defendants and few forum contacts. 20 6 While a forum non
conveniens dismissal would probably have been a more appropriate
result, a relationship between foreign affiliates and an American par-
ent characterized solely by stock ownership without forum impact
should not subject either the parent or the courts to litigation. 20 7
In federal securities and commodities litigation there is seldom
any judicial attempt at the type of rigorous analysis applied in state
unitary tax cases to determine whether the defendants are function-
ally integrated economic entities. This suggests that such analysis is
unnecessary to support liability or jurisdiction on the basis of enter-
prise in these cases. The extent to which Copperweld's treatment of
parent and subsidiary corporations as one economic unit will apply
to securities and commodities cases is still to be addressed. Cop-
perweld is consistent, however, with both the statutorily presumed lia-
bility on the basis of corporate control in securities cases and the
statutorily presumed liability on the basis of agency in commodities
cases. 208 Once the requisite forum conduct has been established for
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is generally pre-
sumed in transnational securities and commodities cases. Marc Rich
clearly illustrates the propriety of such a result and is not inconsis-
tent with Hall's prerequisite that a foreign defendant's forum con-
tacts be either related to the litigation or ongoing in nature.20 9
204 501 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Fidenas A.G. v. Compagnie Internati-
onale Pour L'Informatique CIT Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979) for related
litigation.
205 501 F. Supp. at 1037.
206 Id.
207 See, e.g., Fustok v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 546 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Cf
Creswell, 580 F. Supp. 55; AIpa, 573 F. Supp. 1070.
208 As a commercial matter, it is reasonable to assume that a corporation with the
power to control a subsidiary will exercise it in all significant securities decisions or trans-
actions; while the commodities brokerage industry is characterized by corporate affiliates
serving as agents for one another in the world commodities markets. The Marc Rich litiga-
tion clearly illustrates this point, although the petroleum futures trading activity is not
subject to federal commodities trading laws. 707 F.2d at 663.
209 Although the subject matter and personal jurisdiction issues in federal securities
and commodities cases tend to become blurred, most courts will exercise both types of
jurisdiction on the basis of the "effects" principle, as illustrated in Marc Rich and its fore-
runner, Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
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The securities and commodities forum non conveniens decisions,
however, require somewhat closer analysis. These dismissals are vir-
tually never granted when the American marketplace is used to effect
any material part of a given transaction, even when the injury occurs
abroad and the victims are foreign. There seems to be little justifica-
tion for such a result when two conditions are met: if the actionable
conduct is also illegal where the injury occurs abroad; and if the
American corporation neither controls its foreign affiliate's activities,
nor serves as its agent in the challenged transaction. There is no
reason why United States courts should not grantforum non conveniens
dismissals of such cases, because they would not conflict with the
securities laws, which already permit good faith defenses by control-
ling party defendants, or the commodities statutes, which require an
agency relationship to exist before liability may be imposed upon the
domestic broker for the activity of its foreign affiliate.
E. Veil-Piercing Cases in Labor and Employment Law Litigation
While substantive liability and jurisdiction issues affecting the
corporate components of a multinational corporate enterprise do
not often arise in the workplace, except in employment discrimina-
tion suits, many companies, particularly those controlled by foreign
parents, have little, if any, notion of the scope of their potential lia-
bility to their domestic subsidiary employees. Federal labor law has
long recognized the "single enterprise" theory of bargaining agree-
ment liability whenever the relationship between affiliated corpora-
tions is characterized by functional operational integration,
centralized labor relations control, common management, and com-
mon ownership. 2 10 Furthermore, federal collective bargaining law
has long recognized alter ego veil-piercing whenever a second cor-
poration is created by the same ownership and management interests
to avoid bargaining agreement obligations. 2 11
Whether enterprise liability has ever been applied to two wholly
owned subsidiaries of a common parent to impose bargaining agree-
ment liability upon one subsidiary for the obligations of the other is
not clear. Post-Copperweld decisions, however, support the principle
that all wholly owned subsidiaries and their parents are a common
business entity with identical legal and economic interests. Cop-
Cir. 1972). For an excellent summary of these issues, see Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in
Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: The Expanded Application of the Conduct Test, 59 NOTRe
DAME L. REV. 471 (1984).
210 See, e.g., American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers of Pa., 736 F.2d 879,
888 (3d Cir. 1984), for the most recent discussion of this principle, although the court
seems to apply a stricter standard for imposing the rule than is required by other prece-
dent. See also Radio Union v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965);
NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1983).
211 American Bell, 736 F.2d at 889; Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Execu-
tive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1974).
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perweld principles can readily apply to multinational company bar-
gaining disputes.
Although enterprise analysis is both precedented and permissi-
ble in bargaining litigation, it is virtually mandated in federally regu-
lated pension and retirement obligations litigation, subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 212 The key ER-
ISA provision defines an "employer" liable for pension withdrawal
obligations to include all corporate affiliates under "common con-
trol," and its central purpose is to make all solvent corporations
within the commonly controlled enterprise jointly and severally lia-
ble for the pension obligations of any one of them, regardless of
whether any are solvent.21 3 ERISA statutes reflect congressional in-
tent to replace a limited liability rule with one based upon enterprise
liability, which emasculates the reason for separate affiliate incorpo-
ration when applied to economically regulated business activities. 214
Employment discrimination claims against multinational compa-
nies have increased in American courts during the past several years,
generating various transnational veil-piercing issues. The most re-
cent significant case, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,215 re-
sulted in a Supreme Court determination that wholly owned
American subsidiaries of foreign parents are American corporations
subject to federal civil rights laws that bar employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, gender, or ethnic background,
notwithstanding any contrary bilateral treaty provisions that apply to
corporate citizens of the parent's sovereign state. 216 This decision
212 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1309 (1982).
213 Id. § 1301(b)(1). "Common control" in turn is based upon certain common stock
ownership traits among the corporate affiliates. "Common control" signifies all corporate
groups where a parent owns at least 80% of the outstanding stock, all groups where five or
fewer common shareholders own at least 50% of the stock in each group member, and all
groups involving combinations thereof. 29 C.F.R. § 2612 (1984). See Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. Anthony Co., 575 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-51 (N.D. Il. 1982). ERISA with-
drawal liability amounts can be calculated on the basis of an overall corporate group net
worth, a scheme not unlike state unitary taxing principles. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b).
214 "[The] corporate veil was, in effect, pierced by Congress when it enacted the termi-
nation liability provisions of ERISA. The corporate form is a creation of state law and
states may impose stringent limitations on attempts to disregard it . . . . These limita-
tions, however, do not construct a federal statute regulating interstate commerce for the
purpose of effectuating policies . . . . Thus, concerns for corporate separateness are sec-
ondary to what we view as the mandate of ERISA in this case." Anthony, 575 F. Supp. at
956-57 (quoting Senator Williams); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Anthony Co., 537
F. Supp. at 1053. See also Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Quimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1983).
215 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
216 The key issue was whether the American subsidiary could be a Japanese company
granted certain employment privileges under the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
Treaty, Apr. 2, 1953, Japan-United States, art. VIII, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, or
whether the subsidiary was an American "employer" subject to the employment discrimi-
nation bans of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). By opting to treat
the domestic subsidiary as a domestic "employer" under the state of incorporation theory,
the Court expressly rejected application of a "control" test in favor of a rule based upon
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implicitly rejects enterprise analysis by refusing to treat parent and
subsidiary as one economic entity and ignores the economic charac-
teristics of most foreign-based multinational companies, which con-
tinuously interchange key alien personnel. 21 7 Although the Avagliano
Court left open the question whether a foreign parent may be liable
for wrongful discrimination by its domestic subsidiary, there is ample
authority to suggest that a parent and its subsidiary will be treated as
the same employer for discrimination liability purposes when the
parent exercises sufficient control over the subsidiary's hiring and
promotion decisions and retains a high level of economic
integration. 21 8
Although vigorously enforced in the American workplace, fed-
eral employment discrimination laws generally do not apply to
American employer hiring and promotion activities abroad, even
when the American parent closely controls its foreign affiliates. 219
This bias against the extraterritorial application of federal fair em-
ployment law is even stronger in the case of foreign affiliates of
American parents. 220 Ironically, foreign corporations not otherwise
subject to American law may be made fully liable for employment
discrimination by domestic subsidiaries merely on the basis of Amer-
ican corporate identity, while American corporations generally sub-
ject to American law have little, if any, legal responsibility for
discriminatory treatment against their own citizens that occurs
abroad. This is a clear example of form prevailing over substance of
a multinational company.
Another area of increasing legal controversy is that related to
parent corporation liability for workplace injuries caused to the em-
form over substance. 457 U.S. at 183-85, 185 n.ll. See Note, The Rights of a Foreign Corpo-
ration and Its Subsidiary Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L LAw & EcoN. 607 (1983).
217 The extent to which a key employee may work for both the foreign parent and its
domestic affiliate may be affected by pending litigation. Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),
Inc., 725 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1984). See id. at 971-72 for precedent that parallels Avagliano.
218 Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Trevino v. Celanese Corp.,
701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1983); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa.
1984).
219 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I expressly exempts the employment of aliens outside the
United States, while courts generally have ruled that age discrimination suits against
American employers may not be brought by American citizens for employment practices
abroad under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982),
which incorporates the foreign employment exemption provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982). See Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607
(3d Cir. 1984). Although federal statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gen-
der, race, and religious employment practices do not contain foreign employment exemp-
tions, courts have been reluctant to apply them extraterritorially because of a general
policy against extraterritorial application of federal labor laws. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 609;
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963).
But see Bryant v. Int'l Schools Serv., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 482 (D.NJ. 1980), rev 'd on other
grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
220 Mas Marques v. Digital Equipment Corp., 637 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1980).
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ployee of a subsidiary. Generally, an employee may not sue the em-
ployer for such injury, because of state workers compensation
provisions; nor may the employee sue the employer's corporate affili-
ate for workplace injury where the affiliate's acts are unrelated to the
injury, because employer liability cannot be imputed to its affiliate in
such circumstances. 22 ' Where a parent corporation has a direct rela-
tionship to the employee's injury, however, some courts will permit
separate actions against the parent. 222 Other courts have held par-
ent corporations liable for injuries to subsidiary employees caused by
parental negligence on the theory that separate incorporation should
burden as well as benefit the enterprise whenever the facts illustrate
the breach of an independent duty by the nonemployer affiliate. In-
consistent decisions, however, are the result ofjudicial disagreement
over the scope and definition of such duty.223
Proof of an alter ego relationship in such cases has likewise cre-
ated some conflicting decisions. Close control and functional inte-
gration between affiliated corporations is supposed to make them
one legal entity for liability purposes, but when strictly applied, this
rule makes the combined entity an employer for workers compensa-
tion purposes even though the insurance may be limited to the sub-
sidiary. 224 Conversely, where both parent and subsidiary are insured
by the same compensation policy, and an alter ego relationship ex-
ists, there is little basis for permitting a separate employee workplace
injury claim against the parent. 2 25 A better approach would be to
require parental coverage on the workers compensation policy when-
ever the parent engages in more than a passive investor role regard-
ing its affiliate's workplace activities, and limit recovery to workers
compensation. This is consistent with an enterprise theory and
would result in few, if any, injustices to the injured employee.
Enterprise analysis can apply to most, if not all, types of veil-
piercing issues in cases arising from employment relations and em-
ployee injuries, although the Avagliano discrimination decision may
require modification of the entity rule. Wherever a parent corpora-
221 Shields v. San Diego County, 155 Cal.3d 103, 202 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35-36 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984). This principle has been used to bar recovery against holding company par-
ents of employer subsidiaries. See Mitchell v. Shell Oil Co., 579 F. Supp. 1326 (D. Mont.
1984).
222 For example, courts have held that a subsidiary employee may bring a products
liability action against the parent that manufactures the product causing the harm regard-
less of whether the parent exercises control over the workplace. Gigax v. Ralston Purina
Co., 136 Cal.3d 591, 186 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
223 Compare Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 836 (1980), with Love v. Flour Mills of America, 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981).
224 See Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) amending Gregory
v. Garrett Corp., 578 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (involving questions of fact with regard
to whether subsidiary has an alter ego with regard to employment of flight crews and
ownership of aircraft). Cf Peterson v. Trailways, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 827 (D. Colo. 1983).
225 Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Wilkerson, 420 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1982).
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tion has final decision-making power over a bargaining agreement
and key personnel and workplace decisions, there is little justification
for refusal to impose liability across the board. An enterprise liabil-
ity rule could eliminate inconsistent and often illogical results in em-
ployee personal injury suits against employer corporation affiliates.
F. Veil-Piercing Developments in Additional Federal Claims
Various other federal statutes support legal claims against the
corporate components of a multinational company. These statutes
encompass substantive areas as disparate as export controls and the
overseas operations of American banks. In general, absent evidence
of contrary congressional intent, these statutes and the power of the
courts to enforce them apply extraterritorially to reach the conduct
of a foreign affiliate of a domestic corporation. When to pierce the
corporate veil in such cases is decided according to federal common
law.2 26
Even when veil-piercing statutory authority appears to exist,
however, courts may be reluctant to exercise it, as seen in Rose Hall,
Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp.2 27 Rose Hall involved
statutory construction of federal Edge Act provisions 228 in regard to
the liability of American banks for offshore activities of their foreign
branches and subsidiaries. The decision illustrates preference for
Cannon formalism principles over enterprise analysis. Among the nu-
merous legal issues in the dispute was whether an American bank
could be liable for the alleged fraudulent and other tortious conduct
by its overseas subsidiary in a series of complex hotel investment
transactions that were apparently subject to close parental scrutiny.
Despite both the existence and exercise of control over the chal-
lenged activities, the court refused to impose a strict or enterprise
liability standard on the parent, reasoning that "Congress implicitly
recognized the attendant legal distinction between parent and
226 One of the more highly publicized transnational corporate veil-piercing disputes
triggered by such statute involved U.S. Government efforts to block the overseas subsidi-
aries of Dresser Industries and other American-based multinational companies from pro-
viding key materials to the Soviet Natural gas pipeline project through extraterritorial
application of the Export Administration Act of 1979. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1308 (1983). The United States argued that it had the power to apply the Act to foreign
affiliates of American corporations. This argument is likely to be accepted by American
courts notwithstanding potential conflicts with cases such as Avagliano. One recent federal
appellate court noted, however, that for federal regulatory statutes to be applied extrater-
ritorially, clear evidence of congressional intent to do so is required. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (refusing to apply Com-
modities Exchange Act to permit discovery of Brazilian trader).
227 576 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1983), modifying 566 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Del. 1983).
228 12 U.S.C. §§ 2031-2034 (1982). The Act expressly provides that suits arising out
of banking transactions by Edge Act overseas subsidiaries may subject the parent to liabil-
ity when it controls the conduct of the former.
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subsidiary." 2 29
Rose Hall is troublesome because it leaves the issue of control to
the jury, which invites the application of diverse standards to identi-
cal fact patterns in Edge Act overseas banking activities. This runs
counter to the reason Congress required Edge Act disputes to be
heard in federal courts-the desire to develop uniform national
overseas banking standards. 230 Furthermore, the decision raises po-
tentially complex issues regarding personal jurisdiction and forum
non conveniens. It is not altogether clear whether application of Can-
non formalism principles permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the foreign bank subsidiary solely on the basis of its legal affilia-
tion with a domestic affiliate, even though such jurisdiction is appar-
ently mandated in the statute. Compulsory Edge Act jurisdiction
also apparently foreclosesforum non conveniens dismissals where either
the plaintiff or defendant insists upon bringing suit in an American
court, although Rose Hall did not seriously consider this issue. The
case ignores Edge Act enterprise analysis principles and should
probably not be applied to similar future disputes.
Virtually all federal regulatory schemes, including those
designed to protect American foreign commerce and policy interests
from legal abuse, require uniform legal standards for effective imple-
mentation and enforcement. Such uniformity requires broad appli-
cation of enterprise analysis principles to transnational veil-piercing
disputes, because following Cannon's separate corporate entity rules
necessarily fosters reliance upon numerous equitable exceptions
carved out to justify corporate veil-piercing. Personal jurisdiction is-
sues in these cases pose difficult problems only when the courts rely
upon separate corporate formality to deny jurisdiction over foreign
affiliates of domestic corporations. Such reliance thwarts federal
economic regulatory policy when invoked to keep foreign affiliates
with significant forum ties out of American courts. Enterprise analy-
sis is more appropriate for resolving this issue in federal regulatory
disputes involving foreign and domestic affiliates of a multinational
company.
V. Piercing the Corporate Veil Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
229 576 F. Supp. at 165-66.
230 It also tends to contravene the principle that American banks are generally liable
for the banking activities of their overseas branches, incorporated or otherwise, particu-
larly when, as here, the overseas subsidiary was probably too insolvent to honor its judg-
ment obligations. Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984);
Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 976 (1983). But see Hirsch, Supervising Multinational Banhing Organizations: Responsibilities
of the Home Country, 3J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 238 (1981).
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(FSIA)231 in 1976 to deal with one of the world's most powerful eco-
nomic forces-the commercial enterprise owned by a foreign state.
The FSIA has two purposes: "to facilitate the bringing of suits
against foreign governments arising out of commercial activity in
United States courts," 232 and to "provide a uniform statutory proce-
dure for establishing subject matter and personal jurisdiction over
foreign sovereign entities."2 33 Contemplating that foreign govern-
ments would engage in commercial transactions through state-
owned corporations, Congress made appropriate provisions in the
Act to deal with the legal consequences. 234
The importance of the FSIA to cases involving transnational en-
terprise liability in United States courts should not be underesti-
mated. Although little time has elapsed since its passage, several
rules have emerged from the case law. For instance, when a foreign
state chooses to incorporate a commercial entity in the United
States, the Act does not apply to that entity's conduct.23 5 The extent
to which a foreign state may take advantage of the more stringent
FSIA jurisdiction provisions by incorporating a domestic corporate
shell subsidiary for the purpose of manipulating it is unclear. Be-
cause the Act does not purport to affect the laws of substantive liabil-
ity, the foreign state parent may subject itself to potential liability for
such conduct while immunizing itself from the court's jurisdiction.
The Act is silent on whether incorporation of a domestic subsidiary
by a foreign state is sufficient to bring the foreign government parent
231 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982).
232 Velidor v. L/P/G/ Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed,
455 U.S. 929 (1982).
233 Id. The FSIA codifies the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, limiting such
immunity to public acts as opposed to private or commercial acts. Congress intended to
"make it clear that immunity cannot be claimed with respect to acts or transactions that are
commercial in nature, regardless of their underlying purpose." Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148
(1982) (quoting Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Rela-
tions of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973) (statement of Charles
N. Brower, Legal Adviser, Dep't. of State)).
234 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1982). Section 1603(a) defines "foreign state" to include polit-
ical subdivisions and agencies or instrumentalities. Section 1603(b) defines "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state" to include any entity "which is a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise, and which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state political subdivision thereof," and which is neither chartered nor incorporated under
the laws of the United States or any third country. Id.
235 See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. United States, 639 F.2d 1096, 1098 (4th Cir. 1981),
which analyzes the significance of a railroad merger involving an American corporation
wholly owned by the Canadian Government: "When a subsidiary operates a railroad not in
Canada but in the United States, the fact that a foreign sovereign owns the parent does not
render the railroad operated in the United States any less subject to applicable rules and
regulations pertaining to privately owned railroads." Although Norfolk did not involve the
FSIA, it reveals that the Act does not apply to activities of a domestic corporation owned
by a foreign state. See also Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 271 (3d Cir.
1980).
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into the court's FSIA jurisdiction.2 36
The act of state doctrine is implicated in foreign sovereign im-
munity. Application of this doctrine is well illustrated in the petro-
leum cartel cases, which provoked considerable controversy over
whether an aggrieved plaintiff could sue and recover from foreign
governments for engaging in cartelization with substantial economic
impact in the United States. This controversy culminated in the
Ninth Circuit decision, International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers v. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC),237 which held that neither the member nations of the OPEC
cartel nor the Organization itself could be sued in American courts
for violating the Sherman Act.
The FSIA carefully defines "agency" and "instrumentality" to
guide determination of when to pierce the corporate veil.2 3 8 This
does not, however, end the court's inquiry into whether a court may
impose liability upon a foreign state for the acts of its wholly owned
commercial agencies or instrumentalities. The Supreme Court has
recently addressed this issue in First National City Bank v. Banco Para
El Comercio Exterior de Cuba.239 A bank, wholly owned by the Cuban
government, sued Citibank to recover certain funds allegedly owed it
from transactions engaged in during the Cuban revolution. Citibank
counterclaimed against Banco to recover for losses suffered from
Cuban nationalization of its assets, alleging that plaintiff Cuban bank
was a mere government alter ego that could be liable for its owner's
236 The legislative history makes brief reference to the doctrine of corporate limited
liability, in rather straightforward language of a section that bars execution against the
property of one agency or instrumentality to satisfy a judgment against a different, unre-
lated agency or instrumentality. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6628-29, referring to FSIA section codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1610(b) (1982).
237 649 F.2d 1354, 1358, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The
Supreme Court first identified the act of state doctrine in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250 (1897), observing that "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of a government of another state done within its own territory." Id. at 252.
Courts and commentators alike have attempted to provide a workable definition of
acts that trigger act of state dismissals. Alfred A. Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); Hawk,
Noerr-Pennington Abroad and Foreign Government Compulsion Defense, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 987,
995 (1979). Recent examples of such acts are seen in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occiden-
tal Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983) (mineral concession award); Mol, Inc. v.
People's Republic of Bangladesh, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984) (cancellation of wildlife
export agreements); Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, 686 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1435 (1983) (government takeover of privately-owned
energy company).
238 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1982). S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d
411, 415 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 161 (1983).
239 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
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wrongful conduct. 240 The Court found that since the Cuban govern-
ment would be the only true beneficiary of any successful recovery
on the claim, a refusal to permit recovery on the counterclaim
"would permit governments to avoid the requirements of interna-
tional law simply by creating judicial entities whenever the need
arises." 24'
Citibank sets forth veil-piercing principles that apply in FSIA
cases, at least in a counterclaim context, suggesting that the distinc-
tion between a foreign state and its commercial entities will be ig-
nored when justice requires it.242 The agency theory of piercing the
corporate veil also plays a role in helping the courts determine when
to exercise FSIA jurisdiction over the foreign state itself for the acts
of its wholly owned companies. 243 Before a court may exercise FSIA
jurisdiction, however, the challenged conduct must have sufficient ef-
fects within the United States. 244
Other problems with the veil-piercing aspects of FSIA litigation
are illustrated in a group of recent contract, tort, and business inter-
ference actions against the Government of Ireland and various state-
owned entities. The courts had difficulty determining when and
whether to exercise FSIA subject matter and personal jurisdiction
over the various Irish government defendants for each others' con-
duct and presence.2 45
It is perhaps ironic that parental control over a subsidiary nor-
mally suggests the likelihood that a court will pierce the subsidiary's
veil to reach the parent for redress of a legal wrong. In FSIA cases,
however, such control is often presumed and may be irrelevant to
piercing the foreign state corporation's veil to reach the state. The
most troublesome aspect of this result is that foreign states can use
the corporate structure to engage in conduct that would be barred to
240 Although 28 U.S.C § 1607(c) (1982) provides for offsetting counterclaims, the
lower court refused to permit counterclaim recovery against the Cuban Government be-
cause it found no legal nexus between the claim, the counterclaim, and the nominal par-
ties, concluding that to hold otherwise would violate the FSIA intention "to cause the
courts willy-nilly to pierce the corporate veils of foreign [sovereign-owned] entities."
Banco, 658 F.2d at 919, 103 S. Ct. at 2581.
241 Banco, 103 S. Ct. at 2603.
242 See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 575 F. Supp. 1217; Letelier v. Republic of Chile,
567 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, No. 83-9048 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.
Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
243 See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314; Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for
Chemicals and Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981).
244 See Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
245 Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court fo-
cused on defendants' limited activity in United States, rather than their extensive activity
with plaintiffs in Ireland); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
afg in part and rev'g in part 517 F. Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1981) (although plaintiff brought suit
for conversion of equipment, expertise, and patent rights in Ireland, court concentrated
on defendant's activity traced to United States).
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the private enterprise, leaving aggrieved parties without suitable re-
dress in many cases. Courts began piercing the corporate veil to
avoid such results, and Congress passed the FSIA to enable ag-
grieved parties to seek legal redress, not to prevent them from doing
so. The alternatives are applying enterprise analysis to FSIA
problems or applying potentially conflicting "interests ofjustice" ex-
ceptions. Use of enterprise analysis is preferable, with the caveat
that where the foreign agency or instrumentality consents to suit, the
foreign state probably should not be made a party in the interests of
sound policy. Finally,forun non conveniens should not be overlooked
when the injury occurs abroad, and there is a more suitable alterna-
tive forum.
VI. Conclusion
Current frameworks for resolution of issues of transnational
veil-piercing are inadequate to provide consistent judicial decisions
and uniform legal standards. Such results are unacceptable in for-
eign commerce, which depends upon uniform rules and practices.
Applying an enterprise analysis to resolve transnational veil-piercing
liability and jurisdiction disputes may help bring about consistent re-
sults in the growing body of veil-piercing law.
Courts that apply enterprise analysis to transnational veil-pierc-
ing issues, particularly in the jurisdiction areas, reach virtually uni-
form results. Courts will exercise jurisdiction over the foreign
affiliates of domestic corporations when the affiliates conduct busi-
ness together in a forum, even when such business consists of merely
the exercise of prudent shareholding functions by the parent. This
result is supported by Copperweld's conclusion that parent corpora-
tions and their wholly owned subsidiaries have identical commercial
and legal interests and, therefore, should not be treated as legally
separate entities.
Decisions to pierce the corporate veil are generally made for
proper reasons-to avoid fraud, injustice, or circumvention of an im-
portant regulatory policy. These reasons tend to lose meaning, how-
ever, when courts apply and define them differently in identical fact
situations, as is frequent in veil-piercing litigation. An. enterprise
framework will help to develop a more consistent body of law based
upon economic reality and should result in more effective legal risk
assessment by multinational enterprises.
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